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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Measuring “ability” in macroeconomics
People always have a desire to learn about their “ability” to accomplish tasks
in various situations. Moreover, want to meet that desire as often as possible
in times of emergency. Herein, “ability” will be used to mean the potential
capability that a person has. Demonstrating that “ability” is equivalent to
getting that potential capability under the influence of exogenous factors. For
example, for students, it shows that they accomplish their best performance
when they have a cold. Infrequently, fortunately, they might achieve results
that actually exceed their “ability”.
When people try to estimate their own power, in the case of entering
university, the estimation method is an examination to enter university. The
quantified result of examinations is expressed as a “deviation value”. After
graduating from university, the “ability” is represented as quantified or vi-
sualized outcomes from every perspective except the evaluation of “ability”
related to study, communication skills and a methodical mind. However, the
question remains of whether or not numeric “ability” is valid, in addition
to the problem that it is difficult to estimate the “ability” because of the
unclear definition of “ability”.
Why are people tempted to measure their abilities against others? This
is true because the quantified “ability” is efficient information to ascertain
the present “ability” of oneself and others. Moreover, we can not obtain any
benefit merely by estimating the “ability”. If that is so, after learning the
“ability”, it is important to think of what we should do next. For instance,
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for high school students, who obtain their ability through examinations, they
will be recommended by their teachers to enter universities that are suitable
for their level referred to a deviation value. Then they receive the specific
steps necessary to improve their performance.
We generally note that people might misread something in the evaluation
of “ability” if it is done just one time and using only one method. Therefore,
to judge “ability” objectively, it is necessary at least either (1) to possess the
prior several results or (2) to possess the present several results obtained by
several means.
The story likened to the “ability” of people described above can also
be applied to an economy. In this case, the “ability” of the economy, in
economic terms, refers to a condition called ”potential” or, in restricting
the condition, ”natural”. Because the measured power of humans applies
mainly to academic achievement, the “ability” of the economy shown by
economics is expressed as the total amount of goods and services produced
by the economy in one country. Specifically, gross domestic product (GDP)
is used. In addition, in this case, the definition of “ability” is, based upon
recent macroeconomic theory, that the output is achieved under conditions
in which there is an absence of distortion to the whole economy.
Economists and econometricians frequently seek to assess the “ability”
of an economy. In particular, economists involved in policy-making of the
government or the central bank generally need to ascertain “ability” quickly
and accurately. After estimating the “ability”, they compare it with actual
published GDP, and then regard the economy as down in the case in which
the actual GDP is much lower than the “ability” and conversely regard the
economy as healthy in cases where the actual GDP is much greater than the
“ability”. Finally, they conduct policies to make the economy run to produce
certain outcomes. Furthermore, they can accommodate the scale of policy
based on the degree of deviation between the actual GDP and the “ability”.
Economists and econometricians have continued to make an effort to ap-
proach the best estimation even though they know that they can not obtain
a correct answer. They created several indicative concepts of “ability” and
took much time to produce tools for measuring them. By virtue of their
efforts, almost all estimates stand proof against the above conditions: (1)
to possess the previous several results, or (2) to possess the present several
results by several means.
Our ultimate objective is to re-examine the past “ability” of the Japanese
economy and also to refine and develop a measurement method to estimate
9
a more credible “ability”.
1.2 Review of Japan’s macroeconomy since
1980
The Japanese economy of the 1980s started after the oil shock of 1979. How-
ever, Japan’s economy performed beyond the capacity of the time as if there
did not exist a negative shock in the early 1980s. Japan’s government and
the Bank of Japan went through two difficulties: The oil shock of 1979 and
the Plaza Accord. However, because the Bank of Japan continued to take
a stance of easing monetary policy continuously after corresponding to the
shocks, asset prices rose rapidly. Moreover, because of the stable inflation
rate, the Bank of Japan failed to tighten the monetary policy and acceler-
ated the rise of asset prices. During this period, the 10 year average of real
GDP growth was equal to 4.40%. The 10 year average of inflation was a
stable 2.53%. Especially, Japan’s economy exceeded the potential conditions
prevailing in the late 1980s.
Japan’s economy of the 1990s fell rapidly. In December 1989, after setting
the highest Nikkei Stock Average ever recorded, the Ministry of Finance of
the time notified the total volume control for land to avoid raising real es-
tate prices the next year in March 1990. Therefore, banks suddenly changed
their lending attitudes, which had been loose until then, and asset prices
fell dramatically. The economy to which Japan has come down recorded a
negative growth rate of real GDP and a deflation rate. As if to add insult to
injury, in 1997 and 1998, the financial crisis in Southeast Asia negatively af-
fected the Japanese economy, which was under a tight budget. The economy
fell into a succession of bank crashes. After the bubble burst, the Bank of
Japan presented an easing stance of monetary policy, but it has recognized
the economy optimistically. Consequently, 10 year averages of the growth
rate and inflation are less than half that of the 1980s: 1.46% and 1.21%.
Japan’s economy since 2000 has suffered the aftereffects of the fall of the
economy after the bubble collapse. A main feature of the economy of the time
was “deflationary concerns”. The 10 year average of the real GDP growth
rate has been maintained at 0.89%, but the 10 year average of inflation of
-0.27% reflects a chronically deflationary economy. During this period, the
Bank of Japan took its lessons from the policy mistakes of the 1990s. It
10
implemented a new monetary policy with the commitment that the policy
would be taken for a long time. However, the quantitative monetary policy
was unable to overcome the chronic deflation of asset prices. Unfortunately,
in October 2006, the Nikkei Stock Average recorded its lowest price of the
period. Since then, there has been no effective policy to overcome ”defla-
tionary concerns”. In 2008, there were no opportunities to overcome the
deflation because of the global financial crisis, which propagated from the
United States. However, the Japan’s economy has lately shown signs of an
end to the long-run slump.
11
Chapter 2
Real-Time Estimation of the
Equilibrium Real Interest Rate:
Evidence from Japan
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation
Policy rate decisions made by central banks in real time have a strong impact
on an economy. Most central banks in developed countries adopt a short-
term nominal interest rate as a policy rate to stabilize economic activity and
financial systems: The Uncollateralized Overnight Call Rate in Japan and
the Federal Funds Target Rate in the United States are examples of such
rates.
Under such a consensus of monetary policy rates, when the central bank
sets a target rate for real-time monetary policy, the real equilibrium inter-
est rate (ERR) can be regarded as a benchmark rate among monetary policy
rates. Based upon recent macroeconomics, such as the new Keynesian frame-
work, the ERR is defined as the real interest rate in an economy where no
distortion of price and wage decisions occurs. Some authors refer to the
theoretically based ERR as the natural rate of interest (NRI) 1.
Theoretically, by generating a difference between the policy rate and the
1Wicksell (1936) presented a pioneer study of both the ERR and NRI. Blinder (1998)
differently names the ERR as the neutral rate.
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ERR on purpose, central banks can fine-tune an economy effectively. When
the actual real rate is equal to the ERR, the actual output is coincident with
the potential output, and prices become stable. If central banks raise their
policy rates, then the actual real rate exceeds the ERR and the economy
contracts, and vice versa. Therefore, for central banks, perceiving the real-
time ERR is important for stabilization of economic activity and prices.
As previous works have presented, it is difficult to measure the true ERR
in real time. Nevertheless, many researchers continue to study estimation of
the ERR because estimation of the ERR is believed to enable the sensing
of economic conditions and to support the appropriate conduct of monetary
policy. Specifically, as Orphanide and van Norden (2002) have reported,
the monetary authority might confront two uncertainties from available data
such that the ERR is discredited in real time when estimating the real-time
ERR.
First, one uncertainty arises because of data revision. The data used
in estimating the ERR are often revised either once a quarter or once every
several years. Therefore, the ERR estimated using real-time data differs from
the second ERR using revised data for the same period. Secondly, another
uncertainty is attributable to the acquisition of additional data. Even if
the data are not revised, additional data become available in subsequent
quarters. Therefore, the previously estimated ERR might vary according to
the acquisition of new data2.
The objective of this paper is to point out potential problems that arise
in measuring the real-time ERR using both a conventional method and re-
vised data and to obtain some implications for Japan’s monetary policy with
the specific ERR estimated from a modified model. For these analyses, the
author adopts the Laubach and Williams (2003) model (LW model), which
is based upon the state-space approach3. The LW model has been used in
2The latter is generally regarded as the end-of-sample problem.
3Several approaches have been used to measure the ERR. The first of them is simply
a univariate filtering approach, such as a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Second is a state-
space approach that estimates the state variable from a structural macroeconomic model.
The common shortcoming of these approaches is the lack of a theoretical background for
the ERR. The last one is the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a Bayesian
technique. The ERR comes from the Bayesian DSGE model is most consistent with
the theoretical ERR. However, few studies have examined the Bayesian DSGE approach.
Specifically for Japan’s case, Umino (2013) describes the measure of the ERR before the
bubble burst. For the UK and EU, see Neiss and Nelson (2003), Smets and Wouter (2003),
and Andres et al. (2009) and for the U.S., Edge et al. (2008) and Justiano and Primiceri
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many earlier studies. Furthermore, the estimated ERRs for different coun-
tries and the model characteristics are reported by them. Consequently, this
model can be used to compare the results presented in this paper with those
from other works4.
Moreover, this paper presents specific examination of the control of the
uncertainty under which the variation of the ERR results from the data re-
vision5. First, to ascertain the degree of uncertainty by revising GDP data,
the uncertainties generated by an original LW model are evaluated when
the ERR is measured in real time. Second, data used herein are reviewed
based upon hints offered by Kamada (2005, 2009) to reduce their associated
uncertainty. The original LW model is modified if necessary. Furthermore,
uncertainties of the modified LW model are re-evaluated after reflecting Ka-
mada’s conceptualization.
This paper is the first study of Japanese data that has solved this impor-
tant problem confronting each central bank: measuring the ERR in real time.
Moreover, the scarcity of Japan’s data has supported the implementation of
this study. Our analysis includes several novel features that can differentiate
this study from the existing literature. First, as a report by Kamada (2009)
and other reports of previous studies have described, the real-time estimate
obtained from the original model by Laubach and Williams (2003) includes
considerable uncertainty because of the inconsistency between vintage data
and updated data for the real GDP. Moreover, the original model shows that
the components used to construct the ERR amplify the uncertainty.
Second, to reduce this uncertainty attributable to estimates, the original
LW model was modified. Furthermore, the usage of data that can be revised
was shifted to Japan’s superior Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises
in Japan (TANKAN). Consequently, the real-time ERR, as estimated by the
modified LW model and the usage of TANKAN data, can be shown to have
less uncertainty than that of the original model.
The real-time ERR obtained from the modified LW model shows three
mistakes of the monetary policy management attributable to three judgment
errors. First was the time when the economy decided against monetary easing
during 1993-1995. Second was the time when the Bank of Japan (BOJ) failed
(2010).
4Herein, without eliminating the idea of the original model, a modified approach can
be presented that reduces uncertainty, which is an obstacle to policymakers.
5Uncertainty that creates variation of the ERR from the acquisition of additional data
over time is unavoidable.
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to use an opportunity to take a zero interest rate policy (ZIP) in 1997-1999.
Finally, the BOJ misled the timing to lift the ZIP in 2000. Specifically, it
is easy to imagine that if the BOJ daringly chose a policy with more easing
and if there was neither of the first two judgment errors in the early stage of
Japan’s long-run slump, the recovery of economy would have been brought
further forward.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a
description of the original Laubach-Williams model. Section 3 presents an
evaluation of the uncertainties from the original LW model in real time and
presents some issues for consideration. Section 4 presents revision-free data
and modified models, with comparison of uncertainties from the modified
model with those of the original model. Section 5 presents some implica-
tions for the Bank of Japan’s past monetary policy. Section 6 concludes this
presentation.
2.1.2 Literature review
This subsection presents a review of some studies of the literature related to
the paper contents. With respect to the ERR frequency, these analyses adopt
the same frequency as the theoretical ERR from the New Keynesian frame-
work. However, as explained in Maddison (1995) and in Oliner and Sichel
(2000), numerous previous studies conducted with monetary policy analysis
have shown that ERR is assumed to be constant as the long-term equilibrium
rate. One might readily imagine that the real-time ERR reflects the economy
of the moment and that it varies over time. Based upon the recent theory
of the ERR, Laubach and Williams (2003) and Oda and Muragan (2003)
specifically examine a medium-run concept of price stability abstracted from
the effects of short-run price and output fluctuation6.
Second, with respect to revision of GDP data, as from Faust et al. (2005),
the feature of the Japan’s data revision, i.e., the reason why the preliminary
GDP data differ from the true value, is well known to be ‘noise.’ Furthermore,
when one estimates the true value of GDP as the latent variable from the
featured GDP data, studies conducted by Mankiw et al. (1984) and Mankiw
and Shapiro (1986) revealed that the filtering approach is useful. Therefore,
the estimation model for the ERR as a latent variable is applied to the
6For the Japanese case, see Oda and Muranaga (2003), Iwamura et al. (2006), and
Kamada (2009). For the United States, see Laubach and Williams (2003), Clark and
Kozicki (2004) and Trehan and Wu (2007).
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Kalman filter. In this sense, using the LW model to measure the ERR can
be justified well.
As described in the previous subsection, there must be some uncertainty
in measuring whether the output gap or the ERR. Kamada (2009) examined
the uncertainty of the Japan’s ERR caused by revision of real GDP using a
method that differs from ours7. Based on the classification of four uncertain-
ties by Orphanides and van Norden (2002), Kamada (2009) reported that
the uncertainty of data revision is a fraction of 1% in the estimated ERR.
Furthermore, the greatest uncertainty was obtained from the end-of-sample
problem. These results were equivalent to those presented by Orphanides
and van Noden (2002), who used various methods to evaluate uncertainties
in the US real-time output gap.
To reduce uncertainty in real-time estimation of the ERR, Kamada (2009)
proposed the use of the revision-free data instead of real GDP data. No such
proposition has been advanced in previous studies to reduce uncertainty in
ERR. The usual GDP data must estimate the latent variables as the potential
output or the ERR. However, when ordinary GDP data are not used, the
revision-free data are expected to reflect the level of aggregate demand or
the output gap.
2.2 ERR estimation model
2.2.1 Original LW model
The equilibrium real interest rate (ERR) is estimated using a model resem-
bling that of Laubach and Williams (2003). The dynamics of the output gap
expressed as the IS equation is that of a backward-looking formulation.
yt − y∗t = ay,1(yt−1 − y∗t−1) + ay,2(yt−2 − y∗t−2)
− ar,3
2
[
(rt−1 − r∗t−1) + (rt−2 − r∗t−2)
]
+ !y,t,
(2.1)
where yt is the real logarithm of GDP; y∗t is the potential output. Conse-
quently, the output gap yt−y∗t is defined as the difference between yt and y∗t .
7Real GDP data entail several estimates in Japan: the first preliminary (quick) es-
timate, the second preliminary (quick) estimate, the semi-final estimate, and the final
estimate.
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Furthermore, rt is the real uncollateralized call rate, and r∗t denotes the equi-
librium real interest rate. Similarly, the real interest rate gap is expressed as
the difference between rt and r∗t . Therefore, an IS equation is constructed
from the lags of the output gap, the lagged real interest rate gap, and a
serially uncorrelated shock.
Second, the AS equation based on the Phillips curve is presented as fol-
lows.
pit = bpi,1pit−1 +
bpi,2
3
4∑
i=2
pit−i +
1− bpi,1 − bpi,2
4
8∑
i=5
pit−i
+ by,3(yt−1 − y∗t−1) + bpil,4pilt + bpio,5piot−1 + !pi,t.
(2.2)
The current inflation pit is explained by the first through eighth lagged infla-
tion. The sum of all coefficients of the terms of inflation is assumed to be
one. Moreover, two restrictions are imposed on the inflation terms in the AS
equation. First, the coefficients of the second through fourth lagged variable
are assumed to be equal. Similarly, the coefficients of the fifth through eighth
lagged variable are assumed to be equal. Gordon (1998) and Laubach and
Williams (2003) are followed to set such restrictions. Two variables are set:
core import price inflation pil (excluding petroleum, computers and semi-
conductors) and lagged crude imported oil price inflation pio. Relative oil
price shocks are measured using them. Finally, in addition, the AS equation
consists of the lagged output gap and a serially uncorrelated error.
From Equations (1) and (2), characteristics of the ERR in the paper are
apparent. The definition of the ERR is the real interest rate that keeps
inflation stable and that which neither accelerates nor decelerates economic
activity. The definition of the estimated ERR in this paper must cover that of
the theoretical ERR. The definition of the theoretical one is the real interest
rate in the economy having no distortion of the decision of prices and wages.
Therefore, tightening the assumption that the inflation rates of prices and
wages are stable, the definition of the theoretical ERR overlaps with that of
the estimated ERR. It is particularly interesting that the restriction “the sum
of lagged coefficients to one” strongly affects the definition of the measured
ERR8.
As described by optimal growth theory and New Keynesian theory, ERR
is usually correlated with the growth rate trend. It also depends upon the
8See Appendix A for more information.
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household’s rate of time preference. In this study, therefore, the form of the
ERR is defined as shown below.
r∗t ≡ c · gt + zt. (2.3)
where gt signifies the annualized trend growth rate of real output, and zt
is the factor that influences household consumption demand. Therefore, zt
is regarded as the demand component, for which the process shown below
follows if high persistency holds.
zt = zt−1 + !z,t (2.4)
Consequently, zt is set as a random walk process. As Laubach and Williams
(2003) described, the reason for the random walk process specification is that
because the estimated ERR derives from the AR process, it exhibits large
short-duration swings. If this persists, then the ERR’s definition of frequency
fails.
Finally, data-generating processes of the potential output and the trend
growth rate are given as presented below.
y∗t = y
∗
t−1 + gt + !y∗,t, (2.5)
and
gt = gt−1 + !g,t. (2.6)
where gt is defined as the annualized trend growth rate of the potential
output. Furthermore, !y∗t and !g,t are assumed as serially uncorrelated and
contemporaneously uncorrelated error. Our formulation of the growth rate
trend is given by Kuttner (1994) and is adjusted by many previous studies.
In this form, the trend growth rate is assumed to vary at small variance every
quarter because it is difficult to assume that the trend growth is constant.
The original LW model includes some unobservable variables. This model
is designated as an unobserved component (UC) model. A Kalman filter is
useful to estimate the UCmodel and to generate unobserved data. This paper
presents the state-space representation of original LW model and applies
Kalman filtering to this representation.
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2.2.2 Estimation results
The estimate of ERR for Japan and the data used are shown as quarterly
during 1980Q3 to 2010Q2 in Japan. The logarithmic real GDP (seasonal ad-
justed) is used as the measure of output and consumer price index (excluding
fresh food, seasonally adjusted) as the measure of prices. The expected in-
flation is calculated from the forecast of the univariate AR(3) model. The
nominal interest rate is the quarterly average of the overnight uncollater-
alized call rate, expressed in units of percent per year. The price index of
non-oil imports is not available in Japan. The imported price index is applied
to pilt and pi
o
t−1.
As Laubach and Williams (2003) described, the maximum likelihood esti-
mates of the standard deviations of the innovations to the trend growth rate
gt and the demand components zt, σg and σz are likely to be biased toward
zero. This phenomenon is the ‘pile-up’ problem that Stock (1994) and Stock
and Watson (1998) pointed out. To address this problem, this study uses the
medium unbiased estimator suggested by Stock and Watson (1998). Consis-
tent estimates of the ratios, λg ≡ σg/σy∗ and λz ≡ ar,3(σz/σy), are obtained
in the first estimation. In the final estimation, these restrictions are imposed
to obtain the maximum likelihood estimation.
Table 1 presents estimation results of the original model parameters for
different model specifications. In all cases, the coefficients relating the output
gap to the real rate gap, ar,3, are negative and statistically significant. The
second and third columns report results in the models in which the original
LW model is modified. Especially in the third column, coefficient ar,3 is
extremely small compared to those reported by Kamada (2009) in Japan
and Clark and Kozicki (2005) in the US, which were obtained assuming the
same model.
The sample period in this study includes the financial crisis event. Some
authors have described that the economic structure changed after the finan-
cial crisis. Therefore, it was tested whether this study must consider the
change of the structural break with my estimation. Dividing the sample
period, the estimated parameters over the sub-sample were compared with
the estimated ones over the full sample. Appendix B shows more informa-
tion. Fundamentally, results show that the analysis need not consider the
structural break with the estimation.
Moreover, when the original and a different specification model are esti-
mated in a sub-sample from 1999Q1, even then Japan’s nominal interest rate
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remains at around zero, which confirms that each estimation result of model
parameters is robust.
2.3 Evaluation of uncertainty
2.3.1 Definitions of uncertainty
The uncertainty caused by data revision and accumulation can affect the
action of a central bank. In this context of the output gap, Orphanides
and van Norden (2005) define output gap estimates of four kinds: real time,
quasi-real, quasi-final, and final output gaps. In this case of the ERR, the
ERR is estimated using only vintage data available for each point in time.
Consequently, the real-time ERR is obtained. Next, when a counterfactual
assumption is made that the ERR at period t is calculated using the full
sample data series 1 through T (> t), the quasi-real ERR is estimated. For the
quasi-final ERR, another counterfactual assumption is made that the ERR at
period t is calculated using the estimated model parameters at period T and
the final data series. Then, the quasi-final ERR is calculated. The final ERR
is a series estimated from all data in period t. It is used in usual analysis.
Moreover, for UC models, the quasi-final ERR is a filtered estimate, whereas
the final ERR is a smoothed estimate.
As discussed in some previous reports of studies, three uncertainties are
defined through each difference in the four ERR estimates above. First, the
difference between the real-time and quasi-real ERR estimates is attributable
to the effect of data revision. This study refers to the effect of the first
uncertainty as Error 1. Second, the difference between the quasi-real and
quasi-final ERR estimates is attributable to the effect of model parameter
revision. This study specifically examines the effect of the second uncertainty
as Error 2. Finally, the difference between the quasi-final and final ERR
estimates is generally attributable to the effect of the sample-end problem.
This study refers to the effect of the third uncertainty as Error 3.
2.3.2 Evaluation
Complete real-time GDP data for Japan are unavailable. A dataset such
as the US real-time dataset by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia is
unfortunately not published as historical data. Therefore, the first published
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real GDP data were used - the first quick estimate - from the Nikkei News
Paper (Nihon Keizai Shinbun). Table 2 below presents those results:
1) Error 1 in most estimated state variables is greater than Error 2 or
Error 3
2) Error 1 in the potential output, which is apparently influenced directly
by the revision of GDP, is noticeable
3) Two components of which the ERR consists, ‘g’ and ‘z’, are apparently
sources of high uncertainty in the ERR
4) Because of the data-generating processes of ‘g’ and ‘z’, the uncertainty
of the ERR can be amplified to a greater degree than necessary
Results 1) and 2) show that the real-time latent variables are affected by
the revision of real GDP. From the first column of Table 1, the uncertainty of
ERR (Error 1) is 0.58%. Considering the situation of long-run low interest
rate in the estimate period, this value is larger. Similarly, Error 1 in the
potential output is larger than the other errors. However, Error 1 of the ERR
is larger than that of the potential output. Moreover, the two components
that must be estimated first to calculate the ERR, ‘g’ and ‘z’, have respective
uncertainties that are greater than 1%.
The outcome that the uncertainty of the potential output is higher than
that of the ERR has a close relation with the outcome that the uncertainties
of both g and z are extremely high. The relation is involved in the mecha-
nism that the uncertainty accumulates or propagates from measurement of
the potential output to the measurement of the ERR. First, to measure ERR,
one must have the estimate of the potential output. Next, one can measure
g in estimating the potential output. Finally, in measuring the ERR, under
the estimated g, one can obtain z, which involves the remaining informa-
tion to estimate the ERR. Then, the accumulation of uncertainty starts from
both potential output and g, which are estimated contemporaneously. Fur-
thermore, because of the random walk process in g, the uncertainty persists
and fluctuates. In the step to measure the ERR, the uncertainty of g is
transmitted to z. The uncertainty in z is also persistent and fluctuating.
Especially, from the figure, one can infer that component z strongly in-
fluences the uncertainty of the ERR. Figure 1 displays real-time ERR under
conditions where the BOJ estimates the original LW model every quarter
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and refers to the ERR of the end-of-sample as the real-time estimate. Fur-
thermore, for the GDP data, using a quick estimate in the terminal period t
and replacing the value of the previous t with a revised estimate in the next
period t+ 1, the full sample data are updated and accumulated.
As the figure shows, the difference between the original ERR and g shows
z. From the figure, one can understand that the revision of GDP affects
the ERR strongly and that the source of uncertainty is the component z.
Two definite gaps are apparent during 1993−1998 and 2001−2005. During
1993−1998, a strong influence of z is found because the quick estimate was
underestimated below the revised estimate. In contrast, during 2001−2005,
a strong influence of z is applicable because the quick estimate was overesti-
mated above the revised estimate.
2.4 Modifications and re-evaluation
2.4.1 Modifications
According to the results described above, it is necessary to reduce the un-
certainty of ERR in a real-time estimate, as summarized in the following
two points: (1) rethinking data that present a possibility of revision and (2)
reviewing the data-generation processes of ‘g’ and ‘z’.
The best means to reduce uncertainty is to avoid using data that might
be revised, but this mode of measuring the ERR is not feasible. Data that
might be revised, such as real GDP, are important to estimate latent eco-
nomic indicators. Therefore, if real GDP data are not used, then data must
be prepared that are not revised and which have information related to cur-
rent economic activity such as real GDP. Kamada (2005, 2009) reported such
data in the context that it remedies the real-time output gap. Such supple-
mentary data are taken from the Short-term Economic Survey of Enterprise
in Japan, TANKAN. The TANKAN aims at contributing to the appropriate
implementation of monetary policy by capturing business trends of enter-
prises accurately.
Japan’s diffusion index (DI) in the TANKAN data is suitable as a proxy
of the output gap in that the question format is based on fulfillment. Other
countries have no such data, although many countries report DI related to
production. For example, one can consider that the Purchasing Managers’
Index (PMI) published by the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) might
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be available as a proxy of the output gap and the variable close to the Japan’s
DI. However, the PMI is inappropriate as a proxy for the following reasons: 1)
there exists no question item to construct a Cobb-Douglas style production
function, especially not a question item related to productive capital; 2)
fundamentally, the question format asks the degree of improvement from the
previous period, not the question format of “fulfillment”. Consequently, the
uncertainty of Japan is only reduced.
Kamada (2005, 2009) reports the use of a “Business Conditions” DI of
10 items in the TANKAN. This DI reflects a judgment of general business
conditions of the responding enterprise in light of the company’s profits.
However, this DI is not applied for this study. A critical reason that the paper
does not adopt the “Business Conditions” DI is that, by using it, I can not
maintain the justification over the theory of the ERR (e.g., New Keynesian
framework). It is difficult to understand the “Business Conditions” DI that
expresses the condition to various aspects of production.
Instead, a weighted DI is proposed. The reason that the weighted DI is
used for this study is the following. If the expression of output in an actual
economy is approximated using a Cobb-Douglas production function that is
usually used in the theoretical model, then the (log-linearized) output gap is
given as
lnYt − lnY ∗t = α(lnLt − lnL∗t ) + (1− α)(lnKt − lnK∗t )
where α stands for a labor income share. The Cobb-Douglas type of the
output gap (lnYt − lnY ∗t ) is given as the weighted average of the deviations
between actual and potential quantity (with a superscript ‘*’) in terms of
labor input (lnL) and capital input (lnK)9. Based upon the setting, the
weighted DI in this paper shares the same idea with the Cobb-Douglas type
of the output gap. The weighted DI actually comprises two DIs.
the weighted DI
= α× “Employment Condition” DI + (1− α)× “Production Capacity” DI,
where α is a labor income share10. The “Production Capacity” DI is a judg-
ment of excessive, adequate, or inadequate production capacity or business
9It frequently arises in the minutes of monetary policy meetings because this DI is
superior to the “Business Condition” DI in that a DI that reflects the output gap is
sought here.
10It is assumed to be 0.64.
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equipment of the responding enterprise11. The “Employment Conditions”
DI is a judgment of excessive, adequate, or inadequate number of employees
at the corresponding enterprise12. The results of the survey items “Employ-
ment Conditions” and “Production Capacity” in the TANKAN present the
difference between the current position over the production factors and the
appropriate position considered by the respondents. Therefore, because the
components of the weighted DI are conceptually consistent with the compo-
nents of the theoretical output gap, the weighted DI can be regarded as the
output gap.
When the revision-free data are used and the processes of both ‘g’ and
‘z’ are reconsidered, it is necessary to modify the original LW model. Herein,
the following two versions of the modified LW model are proposed:
Version 1 is to use both the weighted DI and ordinary GDP data, and to
reconsider both ‘g’ and ‘z’ processes.
Version 2 is to use the weighted DI only and to reconsider both the ‘g’ and
‘z’ processes.
2.4.2 Re-evaluation
First, the author examines the relation between the TANKAN and ‘noise’
before applying the TANKAN to the ERR estimation model. No real-time
dataset has been reported in Japan. Therefore, the author gathered both the
first preliminary and second preliminary GDP published in 2006Q1-2011Q2
(benchmark year 2000). The GDP data published first at some point takes
around three years to reach a stable number. Therefore, if the GDP pub-
lished three years later is the true one, then the difference between each
revised GDP and the three-year-later GDP is regarded as noise. Figure 2
presents the relation between noise and TANKAN. The figure displays a
positive correlation, thereby ensuring that TANKAN is helpful to estimate
the true output gap.
11This DI excludes shortages caused by temporary conditions such as a factory closure
for regular repairs.
12The “Business Condition” DI and the “Employment Condition” DI are available from
1980Q1. However, the “Production Capacity” DI is available from 1990Q1. Consequently,
the “Business Condition” DI 1980Q3 through 1989Q4 is used. Then the weighted DI is
adopted.
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Based upon the proposition of the two types of baseline LW model in the
previous section, for Version 1, the two measurement equations of the base-
line model are retained with no change and modify the transition ones only.
This model uses both data that have a possibility of revision (ordinary real
GDP) and non-revised data (the weighted DI). As discussed in the preceding
section, because the published weighted DI already includes a gap form, it
plays a role as a guide of the dynamics of the output gap, as
Based upon the proposition of the two types of original LW model in the
previous subsection, for Version 1, the two measurement equations of the
original model are retained with no change and modify the transition ones
only. This model uses both data that have a possibility of revision (ordinary
real GDP) and non-revised data (weighted DI). As discussed in the preceding
section, because the published weighted DI already includes a gap form, it
guides the dynamics of the output gap, as presented below.
r∗t = 4c(y
∗
t − y∗t−1), (2.7)
and
(yt − y∗t ) = f · xt + !y∗,t, (2.8)
where variable xt corresponds to the weighted DI in the data series; !y∗,t is
a serially uncorrelated error. This model is designated as the Version 1
model, which can estimate the potential output simultaneously.
However, when the weighted DI is fully reviewed as an alternative measure
of the output gap, the weighted DI can be substituted for the output gap y−y∗
in Eq. (1). Then the original LW model transforms into a very simple model.
The Phillips curve, Eq. (2), drops from the original LW model. The ERR
is simply a random walk process, as in specifications explained by Clark and
Kozicki (2005).
xt = ax,1xt−1 + ax,2xt−2 +
ar,3
2
[
(rt−1 − r∗t−1) + (rt−2 − r∗t−2)
]
, (2.9)
and
r∗t = r
∗
t−1 + !r∗,t, (2.10)
Therein, the variable xt which corresponds to the weighted DI in the data
series is the output gap and !r∗,t is a serially uncorrelated error. This model is
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designated as the Version 2 model. Unlike the Version 1 model, the Version
2 model can not estimate the potential output simultaneously.
Therein, the variable xt, which corresponds to the weighted DI in the
data series, is the output gap; !x,t and !r∗,t are serially uncorrelated error
values. This pilot model is designated as the Version 2 model. Unlike
the Version 1 model, the Version 2 model can not estimate the potential
output simultaneously.
Table 3 shows that the greatest uncertainty in the ERR and output gap
becomes less than those in the original LW model. For the Version 1 model,
the ERR’s uncertainty caused by the data revision (Error 1) is decreased
by 85% relative to that obtained using the original model. In addition,
uncertainty in the output gap drops to a much lower value. The sample-
end problem in both ERR and output gap (Error 3) is mitigated. Based on
results obtained for the Version 2 model, of course, because real GDP is not
used, the uncertainty by the data revision does not rise. Instead, the Error
3 increases by 2.6%.
The ERR comes from the modified model that strongly involves the influ-
ence of data revision. Given the figure of the data series of both the modified
ERR and the original one, they must mutually differ for two reasons. First,
in measuring the ERR obtained from the original LW model, the stage to
measure the potential output is highly sensitive to the data revision. Fur-
thermore, the influence spreads to the stage to estimate the demand shock
component ‘z’, and to ‘z’ itself, amplifying the influence of the data revision.
Although measuring the ERR from the modified LW model is expected to
be influenced by the data revision, which is the same degree as the case of
the original ERR, because the weighted DI gives the direction to measure the
potential output, the influence of the data revision on the estimated ERR
becomes small. Second, put simply, if the degree of the data revision is large,
then the two ERRs differ greatly.
2.5 Implications for BOJ monetary policy
This section presents implications for the BOJ’s monetary policy through the
estimated historical ERR derived from the model modified from the original
LW model. Similarly to Figure 1, Figure 3 displays real-time ERR estimated
from the modified LW model corresponding to the Version 1 model (solid
line). The real-time ERR is estimated from the original LW model (dashed
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line).
A characteristic of the figure shown above is that the estimated ERR from
the modified model differs from the ERR from the original model during 1993-
1997 and 2001-2005. This difference is caused by the difference between the
first preliminary estimate of GDP and the second preliminary one. The gap
separating the modified ERR and the original one during 1993-1997 results
from the more-underestimated first preliminary GDP than from the second
preliminary estimate. Furthermore, the demand shock component z which
absorbs the effect of the gap separating the first and second preliminary GDP
amplifies the uncertainty of ERR in real time. The gap of 2001-2005 similarly
stems from the overestimated first preliminary GDP relative to the second
preliminary GDP.
With acknowledgment of the two gaps in those two periods, the validity
of the judgment of the past monetary policy management will be reviewed
because the modified ERR has higher liability than before.
As might be expected for a period such as the lost two decades, the mod-
ified ERR is shown below. Specifically, the sample average of the modified
ERR is 0.54%. Furthermore, examination of the monetary policy implica-
tions from the modified ERR revealed that the BOJ has made three mistakes
in its implementation of policy.
1993-1995
Judgment error (1): First chance to introduce a zero
interest rate policy (ZIP)
The BOJ overlooked some fortuitous timing when it should have eased its
monetary policy. During 1993-1995, the figure displays the stable modified
ERR at a low level attributable to the influence of economic shrinkage de-
riving from Japan’s bursting bubble. However, in comparing the modified
ERR with the call rate, the stance for monetary policy shows tightening.
In fact, the BOJ should have lowered the call rate at that time. Further-
more, as implied by the rise of the modified ERR that is apparent from 1996,
Japan’s economy grew despite a small improvement. Therefore, the stance
for monetary policy exhibits easing temporarily until mid-1997.
The BOJ took the unexpected tightening stance for monetary policy dur-
ing 1993-1995 because it emphasized that prices were stable. As evidenced
by some observable data, during the middle of 1994-1997, a marked recovery
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was confirmed from the results of the modified ERR in real time. Because
this resurgent trend likely turned out to back up the BOJ’s monetary policy,
the implicit tightening stance was maintained in the early 1990s. However,
as Jinushi et al. (2000) reported, in considering the long-run slump, the BOJ
optimistically assessed the economic and financial situation and failed to ac-
knowledge the potential severity of debt deflation. Therefore, it can be in
interpreted as a judgment error by the BOJ during that time. A further loos-
ening in 1993 or 1994 might have achieved change in the speed of recovery,
which is a possible explanation for a judgment error in 1993-1995 explained
above.
1997-1999
Judgment error (2): A delay in adopting ZIP
Japan’s economy in 1997 underwent the Asian financial crisis and Japanese
bank crisis. The modified ERR in 1997Q4 reached -0.33% below zero for the
first time because the bubble burst and fell to a record-low -1.69% in 1998Q1.
Furthermore, then, the estimated ERR remained negative until 1999Q1. This
result is reasonable and insightful13. The growth rate of GDP exhibited a
record-low -2.54% in 1998Q1. The actual economy slowed drastically to
average -2.12% during 1998. Both the actual and potential economy were in
a deep slump, underscoring the severity of Japan’s fundamental difficulties.
Despite a definite economic slowdown, the BOJ had set the ZIP in 1999.
This delay in policy decision is explainable: the BOJ has no severity in
recognition of that contemporary economic situation. The weakness in the
judgment of economic conditions within the BOJ is evident from a newspaper
interview with the Director-General of the Research and Statistics Depart-
ment of the BOJ of that time14. From that interview, the director presents
his view that only a small probability exists of Japan’s economy falling into
a deflationary spiral. However, considering that the current ERR reaches
a record-low -1.69% and that nominal interest rates are substantially posi-
tive, the downward money demand of firms might have occurred; then prices
might have declined by reducing production (supply curve shifts down), and
the economic recession might have accelerated. Therefore, sufficient prob-
13The original ERR even reached the zero lower zone in 1998Q2 and 1998Q3.
14See Nikkei News Paper, page 5, 14 May, Morning edition, 1998. The article ID:
NIRKDB19980514NKM0045.
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ability of a deflationary spiral existed at that time. As explained above,
because each estimate of the ERRs in the figure displays the values that
are available at the time when the BOJ chooses monetary policy, the BOJ
definitely made a mistake in timing to take the ZIP again. Indeed, the BOJ
adopted the policy at a time when one year had fully passed because the
modified ERR fell below zero. Ideally, the policy might have been embraced
after the banking crisis. This is a possible explanation for a judgment error
in 1997-1999 described above (Fig. 3).
2000
Judgment error (3): Losing recognition of current con-
ditions when lifting the policy
With respect to lifting the ZIP, the figure also reveals the weakness of the
BOJ’s recognition of the economic situation in 2000. The GDP growth rate
rose to 2.40% and 2.16% in 2000Q1 and Q2. Under the recognition of re-
covery, the monetary policy meeting decided to lift the ZIP in August 2000
because the policy was adopted in February 1999. From the minutes of the
monetary policy meeting of that time, the board member shared the current
economic situation “the economy had reached the stage where deflationary
concern had been dispelled”. However, the recognition remained doubtful.
The modified ERR was 1.31% in 2000Q2, when the GDP growth rate was
much higher than the ERR: 2.16%. The real economy temporarily exceeded
the potential economy without just cause. Therefore, the release of the ZIP
should have been rejected as premature.
From the minutes of the monetary policy meeting of August 2000, it can
be interpreted that a downward risk existed for the actual economy. Ex-
Member of the monetary policy Kazuo Ueda persuaded other members and
the BOJ’s executives, who had tried to pass the Chairma’s ‘lifting’ policy
proposal. He said that the remaining possibility that Japan’s current econ-
omy still faced deflationary concerns and the output gap15. Moreover, he
remarked that bearing in mind that the nominal interest rate had been kept
close to zero to that time, they should not decide to lift the policy based on
that positive information, which was such weak information that the BOJ
15See Ueda’s statement under debate on economic and financial developments in August
11, 2000.
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could not fine-tune the policy rate16. The minutes from 2000 reveal that
most members did not consider rechecking the economy, although the eco-
nomic recovery did not involve the upward potential growth rate. This is a
possible explanation for the judgment error in 2000 described above (Fig. 3).
2001-2005
The timing of introduction of quantitative easing (QE) policy and the contin-
uation of the policy thereafter are appropriate, unlike other judgment errors.
Immediately before adopting the QE policy in 2000Q4, the modified ERR
recorded 1.66% and declined continuously thereafter. In 2001Q3, the esti-
mated ERR reached the zero lower zone again. In fact, the BOJ adopted
the QE policy as a new monetary policy in 2001Q1. By changing the main
operating target for money market operations to the outstanding balance of
the current account at the BOJ, it is not proper to analyze monetary policy
through a comparison between the ERR and the call rate. However, the con-
sistent policy that gives the easing stance has no effect on the real economy
except when the ERR is below zero (2001Q3-2002Q2).
2006-
The stance of continued easing until the financial crisis is appropriate. After
releasing the QE policy, the modified ERR did not fall below zero before the
financial crisis. It hovered around 1%. Interpreting the monetary policy from
the modified ERR, from the nearly 1% ERR and the deflationary expecta-
tion that has remained, it is inferred that the equilibrium nominal interest
rate was close to zero. Such a low-equilibrium nominal interest rate is con-
sistent with the actual nominal rate. Consequently, the stance for continued
monetary policy intervention can be supported.
2.6 Conclusion
The notion of measuring the ideal level of something, such as ERR, is akin
to the notion of calculating a class curve of a placement test. The class
curve of the routine test that is taken at the time of the academic ability test
16See Ueda’s statement under debate on monetary policy for the immediate future in
August 11, 2000.
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corresponds to the momentum at that time (the policy rate). The deviation
value depends both on the current ability of a student and the student’s
condition at the time the placement test is taken. It has good quality and
remains stable. When a student who has some level of ability receives a low
deviation value in the placement test, the reason for the result might derive
from some exogenous factor, such as illness. This phenomenon corresponds
to an economic shock in terms of economics. Finally, the teacher grades the
placement test and considers the periodic exam. Then the teacher instructs
the students appropriately.
Similar to that concept of a class curve, the ERR is extremely important
for an agent in an economy. Especially for a central bank, which has an
obligation to navigate the economy, measuring ERR that is always up-to-
date and accurate is an important task. However, the problem of real-time
estimation that Orphanides and van Norden (2002) pointed out also arises
in estimating the ERR when the central bank attempts to capture the ERR
dynamics in real time using all available data. Results of this study showed
that the real-time estimation of the ERR using the method of Laubach and
Williams (2003) includes several types of uncertainty that arise through pro-
cesses of data revision and accumulation. The central bank faces the risk
of making a poor decision about monetary policy using the real-time ERR.
Especially, the effect of the data revision is not negligible in the context of
a zero bound interest rate. The model specification amplifies such effects.
Therefore, to reduce the uncertainties of the real-time ERR estimate, when
the revision-free data, specifically the weighted DI for TANKAN, were used
as an indicator of the output gap and the LW model was modified appro-
priately, most uncertainties in the modified LW models became lower than
those of the original LW model.
Regarding past monetary policy, the BOJ made three mistakes: 1) it
failed to ease the monetary policy aggressively immediately after the bubble
burst; 2) it waited to implement ZIP after the Asian financial crisis and the
Japanese banking crisis; 3) it rushed the decision to lift ZIP. Although not all
causes of Japan’s long-run stagnation are related to the BOJ’s monetary pol-
icy, considering that the BOJ is an agent intended to safeguard the economy,
it must make correct decisions using accurate information.
Possible extensions can be made to this avenue of research. First, the
influence of financial factors on the ERR has not been examined. It is neces-
sary to construct a new weighted or composite DI that captures the business
fluctuation originating in the financial system using financial DI published
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in the TANKAN. Second, the estimated ERR described in this paper is not
consistent with the theoretical concept. Using a Bayesian DSGE model, it
is necessary to measure the ERR and to present the problem in real-time
estimation. Therefore, comparison of results obtained from the Bayesian
DSGE model with this paper can contribute to efforts to measure ERR more
accurately.
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Table 2.1: Parameter Estimates
original LW model Version 1 Version 2
Parameters Estimates t-value Estimates t-value Estimates t-value
ay,1 0.660 2.508 1.025 26.746 0.986 16.484
ay,2 0.285 1.083 0.007 6.571 0.005 1.357
ar,3 -0.114 -2.253 -0.006 -8.665 -0.015 -4.214
bpi,1 0.688 5.516 1.305 0.571
bpi2 0.109 0.595 0.198 0.146
by,3 1.026 2.078 0.047 4.590
bpim,4 0.008 1.006 0.039 0.857
bpim,5 0.006 0.883 -0.017 -0.484
c 0.948 0.795 0.681 3.593
f 0.060 1.786
σy 0.948 2.472 0.362 2.880 0.413 9.063
σpi 0.619 4.990 0.491 6.526
σy∗ 0.846 9.940 0.233 4.461
σg 0.177
σz 0.886
σr∗ 0.552
MUE λg =0.210 λr∗ =0.020
λz=0.224
Note: λg = σg/σy∗,λz = ar,3(σz/σy),λr∗ = ar,3(σr∗/σy).
All estimates are for 1980Q3–2010Q2.
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Table 2.2: Evaluation of the uncertainty on the baseline LW model.
Error 1 Error 2 Error 3
r∗ 0.584 0.022 0.739
g 1.363 0.041 0.515
z 1.377 0.016 0.603
y − y∗ 0.299 0.015 0.268
Note: All numbers are root square means of the revision series shown. All
statistics are for 1993Q1–2010Q2.
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Table 2.3: Evaluation of uncertainty of the modified models.
Error 1 Error 2 Error 3
Version 1 r∗ 0.083 0.208 0.258
y − y∗ 0.0002 0.002 0.258
Version 2 r∗ 0.069 2.602
Note: All numbers are root square means of the revision series shown. All
statistics are for 1993Q1–2010Q2.
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Figure 2.1: Real-time ERR estimated from the “original” Laubach-Williams
model
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The ERR from the ’original’ LW model
The g from the ’original’ LW model
Call Rate
Note: The ERR is shown as the solid line; the trend growth rate is shown as
the dashed line. The call rate is shown as the bar graph. The sample period
is 1993Q1-2010Q2.
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Figure 2.2: Preliminary data revision and the weighted DI
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Figure 2.3: Real-time ERR estimated from the “modified” Laubach-Williams
model
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The ERR from the ’modified’ LW model
The ERR from the ’original’ LW model
Call Rate
Note: The “modified” ERR obtained from the Version 1 model is a solid
line; the “original” ERR is a dashed line. The call rate is shown as the bar
graph. The sample period is 1993Q12010Q2.
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2.7 Appendix A Restriction: “sum of the co-
efficients to one”
With respect to the restriction of the coefficient on the lagged inflation terms,
if there is neither the restriction nor import inflation (shock), then Equation
(2) can be rewritten as
pit = bpi,1pit−1 + bpi,2pit−2∼4 + δpit−5∼8 + bpi,3(yt−1 − y∗t−1), (2.11)
where pit−2∼4 ≡ 13
∑4
i=2 pit−i and pit−5∼8 ≡ 14
∑8
i=5 pit−i. In this case, the
first restriction that the coefficients on the second through fourth lags of
inflation are assumed to be equal to each other as are the coefficients on the
last four lags have been maintained. If the following equation holds,
pit = pit−1 = pit−2∼4 = pit−5∼8 = µ, (2.12)
then the AS curve can be rewritten as
µ = bpi,1µ+ bpi,2µ+ δµ+ bpi,3(yt−1 − y∗t−1), (2.13)
and
(yt−1 − y∗t−1) = {1− (bpi,1 + bpi,2 + δ)}
µ
bpi,3
. (2.14)
When the restriction bpi,1+ bpi,2+ δ = 1 is introduced, then the expression
above can be finally rewritten as
(yt−1 − y∗t−1) = 0, (2.15)
or
yt−1 = y∗t−1. (2.16)
The restriction “bpi,1 + bpi,2 + δ = 1” can be reinterpreted. Holding the
restriction assures that, if in an economy
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strict assumption The inflation rate is stable over the past two years
mild assumption The current inflation is equal to both previous inflations,
pit−2∼4 = 13
∑4
i=2 pit−i and pit−5∼8 =
1
4
∑8
i=5 pit−i, then the actual output
reaches the potential output.
Consequently, the equilibrium real interest rate can be measured because
of that restriction.
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2.8 Appendix B Robustness check
With respect to structural breakdown during the financial crisis, the model
parameters were re-estimated with the following sample period of three kinds.
Table 2.4: Parameter estimations for robustness check
1980q3-2007q4 1980q3-2008q4 1980q3-2010q2
ay,1 0.660 (2.225) 0.660 (2.361) 0.660 (2.508)
ay,2 0.285 (0.999) 0.285 (1.028) 0.285 (1.083)
ar,3 -0.114 (1.996) -0.114 (2.180) -0.114 (-2.253)
bpi,1 0.688 (4.586) 0.688 (4.848) 0.688 (5.516)
bpi,2 0.109 (0.504) 0.109 (0.515) 0.109 (0.595)
by,3 1.026 (1.800) 1.026 (1.926) 1.026 (2.078)
bpim,4 0.008 (0.957) 0.008 (0.966) 0.008 (1.006)
bpim,5 0.006 (0.763) 0.006 (0.769) 0.006 (0.883)
c 0.948 (0.654) 0.948 (0.660) 0.948 (0.795)
σy 0.458 (2.186) 0.458 (2.275) 0.458 (2.472)
σpi 0.619 (4.507) 0.619 (4.664) 0.619 (4.990)
σy∗ 0.846 (6.231) 0.846 (6.886) 0.846 (9.940)
Note: Parentheses present t-value.
In the table shown above, comparing the full-sample estimated parame-
ters with the estimated parameters for two other sample periods, no differ-
ence arises from rounding off to three decimal places. Rather, the differences
derived from rounding to the eighth decimal places are small. Therefore,
consideration of a structural break by that financial crisis is unnecessary.
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Chapter 3
Structural Estimation of the
Equilibrium Real Interest Rate:
A Bayesian DSGE Approach
Monetary policy analysis often takes account of the real interest rate gap,
defined as a deviation of the actual real interest rate from the equilibrium
real interest rate (ERR) because the real interest rate gap is regarded as
an important indicator of overall macroeconomic conditions and because it
plays an important role in the determination of monetary policy. A crucial
problem is that the ERR is not observable, forcing researchers to rely on
uncertain estimates. A main objective in this paper is to measure Japan’s
real interest rate gap and also the ERR.
As described in this paper, a first sub-objective is to reevaluate monetary
policy in the late 1980s using the interest rate gap from a dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with structural estimation, especially
related to the natural rate of interest that is definable as the ERR consis-
tent with price flexibility, following Woodford (2003) and Neiss and Nelson
(2003). Therefore, we can explore the possibility of application to monetary
policy. Especially, the conclusion reported by Jinushi, Kuroki, and Miyao
(2000) is reconsidered: that tightening of the monetary policy in 1987?88
was delayed. This paper reveals that there exists a delay of monetary policy
including actual tightening by interpreting the natural rate of interest (NRI)
as measured from a DSGE model.
The call rate has remained continuously at a low level, very close to zero,
because the Bank of Japan adopted a zero interest rate policy in 1999 and
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because it successively administered a quantitative easing policy in 2001.
Dealing with such an economic situation in a DSGE model, as Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003) have documented, it is necessary to impose a zero lower
bound constraint that eliminates the negative policy rate proposed using a
certain monetary policy rule. Therefore, a minor objective of this paper is
to review results from the Bayesian estimated DSGE model without the zero
lower bound constraint. Consequently, this paper presents the effect of zero
interest rates, which cannot be ignored.
It is readily apparent that a macroeconomic model that enables forecast-
ing of an economy and analyses of a policy’s impact has been developed,
but it has not reached its zenith of applicability. Considering future policy
action, it is important to obtain an evaluation of past policy through em-
pirical works based upon historical data. Estimation of a backward-looking
macroeconomic model was done in a mainstream manner in previous stud-
ies. However, for policy analysis, these models are not included in the Lucas
(1976) critique of reduced-form models: that they lack microfoundations.
Now that it is possible to use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model describing a national economy, the interest rate gap or the
NRI estimated in the paper is consistent with a fully specified New Keynesian
DSGE model, which is derived from optimization problem of households and
firms. Moreover, using Bayesian techniques, the Bayesian-DSGE (B-DSGE)
model, which is a point connecting theory with reality, is available for us.
Bayesian likelihood approaches have been used to estimate a fully spec-
ified DSGE model since Smets and Wouters (2003). The DSGE model in
this paper resembles that which excludes the investment-specific technolog-
ical progress from the Hirose and Kurozumi (2012) model. Sugo and Ueda
(2008) and Fujiwara et al. (2011) also estimate the large-scale DSGE model
with Bayesian techniques and Japan’s aggregate time series data.
3.1 The Linearized DSGE Model
The DSGEmodel presented herein mostly follows that of Hirose and Kurozumi
(2012). The estimated linearized DSGE model is presented in the next sec-
tion. The dynamics of consumption, which follows from the consumption
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Euler equation with respect to consumption and bond-holding, is given as
cˆt =
1
Ω2Ω3
θ
z
cˆt−1 +
1
Ω3
(
βθ
zα
1
Ω1Ω2
+
1
Ω2
+
βθ
zα
1
Ω1Ω2
θ
z
)
Etcˆt+1 − βθ
zα
1
Ω1Ω2Ω3
Etcˆt+2
− 1
σ
(Rˆt − Etpˆit+1 − rNt ) (3.1)
where cˆt is consumption,Rˆt is nominal interest rate, and pˆit is the inflation
rate. Ω1 ≡ 1 − θ/z, Ω2 ≡ 1 − βθ/zα, Ω3 ≡ 1/Ω2 + βθ/zα(1/Ω1Ω2)(θ/z) +
1/Ω2(θ/z). Then the natural rate of interest rˆNt is defined as the following.
rˆNt ≡−
σ
Ω2Ω3
θ
z
zzt +
σ
Ω3
(
βθ
zα
+
1
Ω2
θ
z
+ 1
)
Etz
z
t+1 −
βθ
zα
σ
Ω1Ω2Ω3
Etz
z
t+2
+
1
Ω2Ω3
zbt −
1
Ω2Ω3
(
βθ
zα
+ 1
)
Etz
b
t+1 +
βθ
zα
1
Ω2Ω3
Etz
b
t+2. (3.2)
where zbt represents a preference shock.
Labor supplied by households is differentiated by a union, so that some
monopoly power over wages exists. Such backgrounds result in an explicit
wage equation and allow for the introduction of Calvo-style sticky nominal
wages. Because of nominal wage stickiness and partial indexation of wages
to inflation1, real wages adjust only gradually to the desired wage as
wˆt − wˆt−1 + pˆit − γwpˆit−1 + zzt = βz1−σ(Etwˆt+1 − wˆt + Etpˆit+1 − γwpˆit + Etzzt+1)
+
1− ξw
ξw
(1− βξwz1−σ)λw
λw + χ(1 + λw)
(χlˆt − λˆt − wˆt + zbt ) + zwt ,
(3.3)
where wˆt represents the real wage, lˆt denotes labor, λˆt stands for the marginal
utility of consumption, and zwt is a labor shock.
Aggregating the Cobb?Douglas production functions over intermediate
good firms generates
yˆt = (1 + φ){(1− α)lˆt + α(uˆt + kˆt−1 − zzt )}, (3.4)
where kˆt represents capital, uˆt is the utilization rate of capital, and zzt is a
technology shock.
1See Hirose and Kurozumi (2012).
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Each intermediate good firm produces a differentiated good of one kind
by choosing a pair of capital and labor to minimize production cost. Because
of Calvo-type price stickiness and partial indexation to lagged inflation of
those prices that can not be reoptimized, as described in Smets and Wouters
(2003), prices adjust sluggishly to their desired price. Profit maximization by
price-setting firms gives rise to the following New Keynesian Phillips curve
as
pˆit − γppˆit−1 = βz1−σ(Etpˆit+1 − γppˆit) + (1− ξp)(1− βξpz
1−σ)
ξp
mˆct + z
p
t ,
(3.5)
where mˆct denotes the real marginal cost and z
p
t represents a cost-push shock.
As in Hirose and Kurozumi (2012), the capital service firm owns the
entire stock of capital at the beginning of each period. It rents utilization-
adjusted capital to intermediate goods firms. The optimality condition for
profit maximization with respect to investment iˆt yields:
As in Hirose and Kurozumi (2012), the capital service firm owns the
entire stock of capital at the beginning of each period. It rents utilization-
adjusted capital to intermediate goods firms. The optimality condition for
profit maximization with respect to investment iˆt yields
1
ζ
{ˆit − iˆt−1 + zzt + zit} = qt +
βz1−σ
ζ
{Etiˆt+1 − iˆt + Etzzt+1 + Etzit+1},
(3.6)
where zit is an investment shock.
The monetary authorities follow a generalized Taylor rule by gradually
adjusting the policy-controlled interest rate.
Rˆt = φrRˆt−1 + (1− φr)
{
φpi
4
3∑
j=1
pˆit−j + φy(yˆt − yˆ∗t )
}
+ zrt (3.7)
where yˆ∗t is the potential output and z
r
t is a monetary policy shock.
Equations (1)-(7) and just six equations – the capital accumulation, uti-
lization rate, Tobin’s q, real marginal cost, cost-minimizing condition, pro-
duction function, and potential output – determine 13 endogenous variables.
All seven persistent shocks zzt , z
b
t , z
w
t , z
g
t , z
i
t, z
p
t , and z
r
t follow stationary first-
order autoregressive processes2.
2zgt is an expenditure shock.
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3.2 Bayesian estimation
Our estimation methodology resembles that of Smets and Wouters (2003).
We use Dynare, which is a useful tool for conducting Bayesian estimation3.
The Dynare toolbox derives the reduced-form representation of the DSGE
model and automatically provides stability and eigenvalue analysis. More-
over, it enables us to conduct Bayesian estimation4.
Details of prior distributions used in the paper are presented in Table
1. Choosing the prior distributions, we mostly follow the previous literature
related to Japan’s Bayesian estimation: Hirose and Kurozumi (2012). The
last two columns in Table 1 report the posterior for the structural parameters.
The data used for estimation are the real output growth rate, the real
consumption growth rate, real investment growth rate, real wage growth rate,
hours worked, inflation rate, and nominal interest rate in Japan’s economy5.
Similarly to studies by Hirose and Kurozumi (2012) and other studies, all
data were obtained at quarterly frequencies of 1980Q2 to 1991Q4. The end
of the sample is determined to exclude the period of the zero nominal interest
rate policy because this paper specifically examines monetary policy before
the bubble burst.
3.3 Implication
Jinushi, Kuroki, and Miyao (2000) presumed that the average economy dur-
ing 1975-85 was ideal and that the benchmark nominal policy rate arose from
an ad-hoc policy rule. Furthermore, they examined the difference between
the actual policy rate and the rule-based one. As described herein, unlike
Jinushi, Kuroki, and Miyao (2000), who did not consider a desired economy
existing every period by the B-DSGE model, this paper presents a specific
examination of the gap separating the natural rate of interest and the actual
policy rate.
Figure 1 depicts the interest rate gap defined as the difference between the
nominal Call rate and the nominal-based NRI6. The shaded areas indicating
recessions are dated by the Cabinet Office.
3The Dynare file is available from the author upon request.
4See An and Schorfheide (2007) for a detailed explanation of Bayesian estimation.
5See Hirose and Kurozumi (2012). However, different from Hirose and Kurozumi, the
estimated potential output was not used herein.
6From the Fisher equation, the nominal based natural rate of interest here is equal
46
The monetary policy in 1987?88, broadly speaking, was in a position
where the economy was stimulated beyond necessity. After the Plaza Accord
of 1985, the rapid appreciation of the yen brought about recessionary ef-
fects, and because it affected the decline of the potential output, the natural
rate of interest fell. Then, the Bank of Japan implemented monetary eas-
ing. Consequently, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) retained its stance of loosening
monetary policy until the bubble burst. From Figure 1, although there exist
some temporary positive gaps, monetary easing (the negative gap) is main-
tained for three periods. It is interesting that the maximum negative gap is
in 1988Q1. Moreover, as shown in Table 1, although the policy response to
the output gap was quite low (φy = 0.069), the authority preferred stable
inflation (φpi = 1.697) and indexation to the past policy rate (φr = 0.458).
The salient implication is that the BOJ had not misunderstood the potential
economy and that neither economic agent noticed it. Consequently, a delay
of monetary policy easing is evident7.
Because the BOJ would not raise the controlled policy rate, the discount
rate, in 1987 immediately and dynamically, and instead pursued an easing
monetary policy gradually, it cannot be ruled out that it exacerbated the
bubble.
3.4 NRI and the zero lower bound
The Bank of Japan has maintained extremely low interest rates since 1999.
After the bubble collapse, Japan ’s economy stagnated. Few policy-makers
have had a hopeful view of the economy in spite of various policies by the
government and the Bank of Japan designed for its recovery. Specifically, the
Bank of Japan pursued two monetary policies to keep the Call rate low: its
zero interest rate policy (February 1999 ? August 2000) and its quantitative
easing policy (March 2001 ? July 2006).
It is necessary to take account of the negative policy rate calculated using
the monetary policy rule when central banks follow a rule such as a Taylor
rule. The Taylor rule determines a policy rate based on the prior policy
rate, the output gap, and the inflation rate. Considering the periods of the
to the posterior mean of the two-sided smoothed estimate of the natural rate of interest
adding the model-based expected inflation Etpit+1.
7Figure 1 also shows that the easy monetary policy in 1980 and 1981 used to ride out
the recession caused by the second oil crisis in 1979 indicates negative gaps.
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Japanese stagnation, because there existed both a negative output gap and
a deflation rate for some years, the policy rate estimated from the Taylor
rule must have been negative at those times. In this case, as in Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003), indeed, monetary authorities have no choice but to
set the policy rate to be zero. Therefore, in the DSGE model, it is necessary
to include the mechanism to replace the negative policy rate to zero. It is
designated as “the zero lower bound constraint”.
Estimating the DSGE model without the zero lower bound constraint
using Bayesian techniques, the estimated model parameters and other results
can not be reliable. Actually, from Table 2, because of the zero lower bound,
the authors of previous studies of the Japan’s B-DGES models intentionally
avoid using the following periods as sample periods: February 1999 - August
2000 and March 2001 - July 2006. Those periods respectively correspond to
the zero interest rate policy and the quantitative easing policy.
Figure 2 displays estimates of the NRI in differing lengths of sample
periods: 1980Q2 - 1998Q4 and 1980Q2 - 2010Q4. Specifically, the data
shown in Figure 2 depict the deviation from the steady state of the real
interest rate. Two NRIs are similar in the common sample period: 1980Q2
- 1998Q4. However, they differ in their degrees of respective deviation8.
Table 3 shows the results of the Bayesian estimated parameters on two
sample periods: 1980Q2 - 1998Q4 and 1980Q2 - 2010Q4. Generally, in
Bayesian inference, it is noteworthy that the statistical significance is in-
dependent of the number of data samples. The elasticity of intertemporal
substitution σ before the zero interest rate policy is low relative to the result
from the full sample. With respect to the difference in the results of σ, if
the growth trends in both sample periods are similar, the NRI estimated
from the full sample data is higher than that of the short sample period.
Moreover, in household demand, it is interpreted that household consump-
tion demand through interest rate gap declines. Consequently, even when
the Bank of Japan tries to affect household demand through the interest rate
gap, the effect is slight. Considering the zero lower bound constraint must
be justified.
Regarding other results of the estimated parameters in the full sample,
first the steady states of the real interest rate and the trend growth are low,
8The figure captures two featured events: the Asian financial crisis and Japan’s banking
crisis in 1997 and the global financial crisis. These periods when the NRI is below the
steady state continue for one year at least.
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which reflects the long-run slump economy during the periods. Second, the
persistent degree of the policy rate is high because the low interest rate policy
continues to be taken consistently. Finally, the persistence of monetary policy
shock is low, so the persistence of monetary policy shock is low. Therefore,
the monetary policy is implemented with an objective of the continuation of
low interest rate. It is interpreted that the effect of monetary policy through
the policy rate has been lost. As a result, since 1999, the role of monetary
policy changed in the economy. Therefore, to represent the capacity of central
bank accurately in a DSGE model, the zero lower bound constraint should
be imposed.
3.5 Conclusion
As described in this paper, the aim is to evaluate monetary policy of the late
1980s. Results show that the latent interest rate gap that Jinushi, Kuroki,
and Miyao (2000) did not demonstrate that monetary policy was delayed
at that time. Furthermore, the authority could not ascertain the potential
condition of the economy. Monetary policy has remained consistently on the
easing side from 1985.
It has become increasingly important to impose a zero lower bound con-
straint when the sample period is lengthened to estimate the Japan DSGE
model with Bayesian technique. The estimated NRI is expected to be useful
for monetary policy analysis in the future.
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Figure 3.1: Interest rate gap
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Figure 3.2: Natural rate of interest
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Note: The Natural rate of interest shows the deviation from the steady state
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Table 3.2: Parameter estimates
1980Q2 - 1998Q4 1980Q2 - 2010Q4
Parameters Mean 90% interval Mean 90% interval
σ 2.686 [2.024, 3.333] 3.025 [2.315, 3.712]
θ 0.098 [0.044, 0.147] 0.095 [0.048, 0.143]
r∗ 0.570 [0.480, 0.655] 0.563 [0.481, 0.643]
z∗ 0.161 [0.094, 0.225] 0.159 [0.098, 0.218]
φr 0.521 [0.374, 0.669] 0.686 [0.612, 0.762]
ρr 0.775 [0.655, 0.898] 0.657 [0.556, 0.759]
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Chapter 4
Non-regular Workers and the
Stagnant Economy
Since the bubble era, Japan’s economy has not yet emerged from its long-
run slump, which has lasted two decades. The development of non-regular
workers is one noticeable feature that has produced the severely stagnated
economy of that period. Figure 1 displays the transition of the share of
non-regular workers among total labor (hereinafter, the non-regular worker
ratio). Actually, the ratio was 17% in 1986 and was 34% in 2008, doubling
over that period. In fact, one in three workers is a non-regular worker.
Moreover, Figure 1 shows that, after 1990, the number of employees has
remained mostly stable at 50 million, which emphasizes that a rise in the
non-regular worker ratio is attributable simply to an increase in the number
of non-regular workers.
In the 1980s, non-regular workers (often wives) were employees working to
cover income that the main supporters (often husbands) earned. This surely
meant that the income earned by non-regular workers was less than that of
regular workers. However, during more than a decade after the bubble burst,
circumstances by which the number of non-regular workers has increased can
reflect that non-regular workers also play a role of the main supporters of
their own households. If such households increase, then they are not able to
support the same amount of consumption as flexibly as regular households
might.
In Figure 2, it is readily apparent that the income of non-regular work-
ers is below that of regular workers. As this figure shows, the medians are
roughly estimated as around 0.8 million (Non-regular) and around 3.9 million
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(Regular) in 2002, and to be around 1.2 million (Non-regular) and around
4.1 million (Regular) in 2007. What is the effect of such income inequality on
both non-regular workers’ consumption and regular workers’ consumption?
Presumably, no much difference exists between them in basic consumption in
support of necessary expenditures (i.e., spending for food or clothing). How-
ever, non-regular workers who earn low income are unable to spend for hous-
ing investment or durable goods (i.e., automobile or home electronics) to the
same degree as regular workers might. Non-regular workers can not afford to
consume these additional goods aside from required fundamental consump-
tion1: unless non-regular workers borrow additional funds from agents such
as banks, they are unable to purchase these luxury goods and services. Ac-
tually, a high probability exists that they can not pass a bank’s examination
for borrowing because they are non-regular workers and are unable to prove
a stable income.
To date, although the definition of non-regular workers has not been
clear, non-regular workers and the causes of increasing non-regular worker
employment are defined simply here. A sharp rise of non-regular workers
has occurred not only in Japan but also in the United States, the United
Kingdom, European countries, and Korea (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2002). Generally, non-regular workers are de-
fined as workers who are not regular workers. However, studies by Suzuki
(1999) point to a no single common definition of non-regular workers accepted
worldwide.
Some definitions of non-regular workers exist in Japan because some gov-
ernment statistics capture non-regular workers2. Among them, the “Labour
Force Survey”, a survey of households usually residing in Japan, provides
wide coverage of non-regular workers.
Based on the Labour Force Survey, the definitions of non-regular workers
have three varieties. First, non-regular workers are those who work fewer
hours than regular workers (fewer than 35 hours per week). Second, non-
1In January 2009, the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)
in Japan investigated employment of non-regular workers, especially dispatched workers,
using web questionnaires. The web survey, ‘Survey on life and job behavior of dispatched
workers,’ revealed that non-regular workers who are not able to save up money smoothly
account for more than 70% of all non-regular workers.
2Statistical data on non-regular workers are issued by a few government ministries, for
example, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and the Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare.
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regular workers are workers who are not designated as “regular employees”
at work3. Finally, non-regular workers are those workers who have a job
contract that expires within a year. The last definition is the same as the
definition of ‘temporary workers’ defined by the OECD (Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2002).
In this paper for Japan’s economy, referring to the three definitions pre-
sented above, non-regular workers are defined as workers who work shorter
hours than regular workers do. Especially, a dynamic general equilibrium
model is constructed in which such non-regular workers appear at the later
part of this paper, and the model built under the empirical evidence of ag-
gregate time-series. For example, the model used for this study reflects the
feature that regular workers work 1.73 times longer than non-regular work-
ers in point of official working hours4. A firm that hires regular workers
and non-regular workers chooses nonscheduled working hours to maximize
its profit.
Empirical evidence of the causes of increasing use of non-regular workers
has been widely documented by Cappelli and Neumark (2004), Comin and
Mulani (2006), Comin and Philippon (2006), Ono and Sullivan (2006), Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2008), and Vidal
and Tigges (2009). These studies have highlighted the swing of corporate
performance. Especially, for Japan, Morikawa (2010) and Sano et al. (2011)
showed that the reasons underlying increased use of non-regular workers cor-
respond not to the industrial level but to the firm level. Furthermore, another
factor from the firm level is that labor force of non-regular workers is gathered
easily and labor costs are low. As in Autor et al. (2003) and Ikenaga (2009),
such a factor causes firms to decrease regular workers and to hire non-regular
workers, which almost work were simplified by information technology.
What impact does the increase in non-regular workers have on the real
economy? Actually, many reports in the literature have described that ex-
panding the non-regular worker ratio has had a negative effect on firm pro-
ductivity in southern European countries5 (i.e., Sanchez and Toharia, 2000,
Dolado and Stucchi, 2008, and Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007). Oshima (2009)
surveys details of the relation between non-regular workers and productivity.
3“Non-regular employees” are part-time employees, contract employees, fixed-term em-
ployees, and temporary employees.
4Based on Labor Force Survey, the average was calculated from 1990Q4 to 2008Q4.
5From OECD, 15.6% in 1987 → 35.0% in 1995 → 29.3% in 2008 in Spain. 4.8% in 985
→ 12.5% in 2009 in Italy. 14.4% in 1986 → 22.0% in 2009 in Portugal.
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No theoretical study described in the literature has examined non-regular
workers who play a role as representatives of households. However, some
studies specifically examine labor supply heterogeneity with housing invest-
ment. Eusepi and Preston (2009) and related studies portray a model com-
prising employed consumers and unemployed consumers. The model gener-
ates some empirical regularities using U.S. labor market data. The idea that
family members of two types exist in the model economy, which these studies
have highlighted, is adopted here. Moreover, Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli
(2009) studied a general equilibrium (new Keynesian) model that assumes
that some households (borrowers) are subject to borrowing constraints by
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) to purchase housing or durable goods. This per-
spective is also adopted here. Adoption of a borrowing constraint can be
justified from results of some empirical studies (Hayashi 1985 and 1987, Ko-
hara and Horioka 1999) and will add to the borrowers some characteristics
as non-regular workers.
The household types presented in this paper include non-regular workers
and regular workers, not employed and unemployed people. This assumption
reflects that the unemployment rate has remained stable during the past half
decade: some non-regular workers are able to work for a year; others become
unemployed temporarily. If this conjuncture arises every quarter, then the
unemployment rate will be stable. Although many authors have specifically
examined the sharp rise of non-regular workers empirically and have analyzed
some theoretical model with unemployment, no study has introduced non-
regular workers as one household type into a general equilibrium model that
can explain the aggregate time-series evidence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some VAR evi-
dence with the non-regular worker ratio. Section 3 presents the basic model.
Section 4 analyzes its dynamics. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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4.1 Empirical increasing non-regular worker
shock
To assess the impact of a shock caused by increasing non-regular workers, we
estimate Japan ’s quarterly VAR model specified as
Yt =
L∑
i=1
AiYt−i +B!t (4.1)
where !t is a vector of contemporaneous disturbances. Vector Yt consists of
four variables: (i) detrended TFP, (ii) detrended non-regular worker ratio
(s), (iii) detrended real household consumption (Consumption), and (iv) de-
trended real housing investment (Housing), which represents real private res-
idential investment. This composition includes all goods and services which
non-regular workers are unable to obtain easily6. The VAR system is esti-
mated over sample 1990Q4 - 2008Q47. This VAR is used to document the key
relations in the data. Figure 4 presents impulse responses of four variables
to four identified shocks. Dashed lines represent 90-percent bootstrapped
confidence bands.
1. A persistent response of the non-regular worker ratio to own shock;
2. To ratio shock, although not significantly, the negative responses of real
aggregate consumption and housing investment;
3. The response of housing to a shock is greater than that of consumption;
and
4. Neither positive nor negative response of the ratio to a positive tech-
nology shock.
These results are robust to the specifications of alternative ordering and
fewer or additional lags. The remainder of the paper presents development
of a model that is consistent with these facts.
6All data except the calculated TFP are available at the Statistics Bureau of the Min-
istry of Internal Affairs and Communications and the ESRI of the Cabinet Office
7TFP has already been detrended linearly. TFP is estimated based upon Kamada and
Masuda (2001) and Kawamoto (2004), who adopted the TANKAN DI. The VAR system
features a constant and two lags.
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4.2 The model
Consider a discrete time, infinite horizon economy, populated by entrepreneurs
and two types of households. The economy is composed of a continuum of
households in the interval (0,1). There are two types of households, named
non-regular workers and regular workers, of measure s and 1−s, respectively.
The two types of households (workers) have heterogeneous preferences that
non-regular workers are more impatient than regular workers. The term “pa-
tient” captures the assumption that non-regular workers have lower discount
rates than regular workers and firms8. Entrepreneurs produce a homogenous
good, hiring two types of household labor9. Households consume, work, and
demand housing investment. That is, all households derive utility from con-
sumption of a final good and from possessing housing services. In addition,
there are retailers and a central bank. Retailers are the source of nominal
rigidity. The central bank adjusts the short-term nominal interest rate.
Considering a discrete time, infinite horizon economy, populated by en-
trepreneurs and households of two types, this economy comprises a contin-
uum of households in the interval of (0,1). Two types of households exist,
respectively designated as non-regular workers and regular workers, of mea-
sure s and 1− s . The households (workers) of two types have heterogeneous
preferences by which non-regular workers are more impatient than regular
workers. The term “patient” reflects the assumption that non-regular work-
ers have lower discount rates than regular workers and firms10. Entrepreneurs
produce a homogeneous good, hiring household labor of two types11. House-
holds consume, work, and demand housing investment: all households derive
8For earlier models with heterogeneity in discount rates, see Becker (1980), Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), Iacoviello (2005), Campbell and Hercowitz (2006), and Monacelli (2009).
9I will not assume that a non-regular worker get promoted to regular worker or a
regular get demoted to non-regular worker unfortunately. Especially, the assumption of
the non-switch from a non-regular to a regular worker is justified from ’General Survey on
Temporary Workers’ Contract 2009/2011’ by Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (in
Japanese only).
10For earlier models with heterogeneity in discount rates, see Becker (1980), Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), Iacoviello (2005), Campbell and Hercowitz (2006), and Monacelli (2009).
11A non-regular worker is not assumed to be promoted to regular worker or a regular
to be demoted to non-regular worker unfortunately. Especially, the assumption of the
non-switch from a non-regular to a regular worker is justified from ’General Survey on
Temporary Workers ’Contract 2009/2011 ’by Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
(in Japanese only).
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utility from consumption of a final good and from possessing housing ser-
vices. In addition, retailers and a central bank exist. Retailers are the source
of nominal rigidity. The central bank adjusts the short-term nominal interest
rate.
4.2.1 Non-regular worker households
As described above, the existence of non-regular workers is identified here
in point of hours worked. Working hours for both non-regular and regular
workers are composites of scheduled and nonscheduled hours. As the data
show, regular workers work 1.73 times as long as non-regular workers in
point of official working hours; then their scheduled hours are assumed to be
constant. For workers of both types, nonscheduled hours are chosen by firms
in view of the corporate performance and are assumed to be varying.
If the assumptions described above are fully adopted, then non-regular
worker households maximize the following utility program:
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtNU(cN,t,Ct−1, hN,t,Ht−1, LNc,t, LNh,t)
}
(4.2)
U(cN,t,Ct−1, hN,t,Ht−1, LNc,t, LNh,t)
= ln(cN,t − fcCt−1) + j ln(hN,t − fhHt−1)− 1
1 + ηN
{
(LNc,t)
1+$N + (LNh,t)
1+$N
} 1+ηN
1+"N
where household utility depends on the lagged aggregate consumption and
housing and housing investment, defined as
Ct = (1− st)× cR,t + st × cN,t,
Ht = (1− st)× hR,t + st × hN,t,
and
LNc,t = L¯c,N + LcN,t, (4.3)
LNh,t = L¯h,N + LhN,t (4.4)
subject to the sequence of budget constraints (in nominal terms):
PtcN,t +Qt(hN,t − (1− δh)hN,t−1) +Rt−1BN,t−1 + ΞhN,t = BN,t +WcN,tLNc,t +WhN,tLNh,t,
(4.5)
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where E0 is the expectation operator, βN ∈ (0, 1) is discount factor, cN,t is
consumption at t, hN,t denotes the holding of housing, LNc,t and L
N
h,t are total
hours worked for consumption goods and housing investment respectively,
L¯c,N and L¯c,N are constant scheduled working hours for each sector, LcN,t
and LcN,t are variable nonscheduled working hours, Qt is the nominal housing
price, BN,t−1 is end-of-period t nominal one period debt, Rt−1 is the nominal
interest rate on loan between t−1 and t, WN,t is the nominal wage, and ΞhN,t
is nominal adjustment cost for housing, which is symmetric for each agent.
In real terms, (3) reads
where E0 stands for the expectation operator, βN ∈ (0, 1) denotes a
discount factor, cN,t signifies consumption at t, hN,t denotes the holding of
housing, LNc,t and L
N
h,t respectively represent total hours worked for consump-
tion goods and housing investment, L¯c,N and L¯c,N respectively denote con-
stant scheduled working hours for each sector, LcN,t and LcN,t are variable
nonscheduled working hours, Qt is the nominal housing price, BN,t−1 is the
end-of-period t nominal one period debt, Rt−1 is the nominal interest rate on
loan between t− 1 and t, WN,t represents the nominal wage, and ΞhN,t is the
nominal adjustment cost for housing, which is symmetric for each agent.
In real terms, (3) reads
cN,t + qt(hN,t − (1− δh)hN,t−1) + Rt−1
pit
bN,t−1 + ξhN,t = bN,t + wcN,tLNc,t + whN,tL
N
h,t,
(4.6)
where
ξN,t =
φh
2δh
(
hN,t − (1− δh)hN,t−1
hN,t−1
− δh
)2
qthN,t−1, (4.7)
and ξN,t is the real adjustment cost for housing. In addition, qt ≡ QtPt
stands for the real housing price, pit ≡ PtPt−1 signifies the gross inflation rate,
bN,t−1 ≡ BN,t−1Pt denotes the real debt, and wcN,t ≡
WcN,t
Pt
and whN,t ≡ WhN,tPt
respectively represent the real wages in sectors of consumption goods and
housing investment.
As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), a limit is assumed on the obligations
of non-regular workers: if the borrowers deny the call from lenders, then
the lenders can repossess not the expected complete future value of the
housing but a fraction of the value. The borrowers ’assets are equal to
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lenders ’collections after depreciation and paying a proportional transac-
tion cost: mEt (qt+1 (1− δh)hN,t) , 0 < m < 1. In other words, the value
mEt (qt+1 (1− δh)hN,t) is equal to the value of collateral. Finally, the maxi-
mum amount RtBN,t that a creditor can borrow is set as below in real terms:
RtbN,t ≤ mEt (qt+1 (1− δh.)hN,tpit+1) . (4.8)
Assuming that the collateral constraint (8) is always satisfied with equal-
ity in and around the steady state, Equation (8) can be expressed in real
terms as
RtbN,t = mEt (qt+1 (1− δh.)hN,tpit+1) . (4.9)
4.2.2 Regular worker households
Aside from non-regular workers, the economy comprises a type of household
that offers regular workers. They have already turned up in the dynamic op-
timization literature as representative agents. Non-regular workers discount
the future more heavily than regular workers do: regular workers correspond
to patient workers characterized in previous studies.
Moreover, as in previous subsections, regular workers are identified as
workers of the opposite to non-regular workers: the official hours are longer
than the non-regular worker hours.
If the assumptions described above are fully adopted, then regular workers
maximize the following utility program:
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtRU(cR,t,Ct−1, hR,t,Ht−1, LRc,t, LRh,t)
}
(4.10)
U(cR,t,Ct−1, hR,t,Ht−1, LRc,t, LRh,t)
= ln(cR,t − fcCt−1) + j ln(hR,t − fhHt−1)− 1
1 + ηR
{
(LRc,t)
1+$R + (LRh,t)
1+$R
} 1+ηR
1+"R
for which the following are true:
LRc,t = L¯c,R + LcR,t, (4.11)
LRh,t = L¯h,R + LhR,t. (4.12)
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Those expressions are subject to the sequence of budget constraints (in real
terms) as
cR,t + qt(hR,t − (1− δh)hR,t−1) + Rt−1
pit
bR,t−1 + ξhR,t = bR,t + wcR,tLRc,t + whR,tL
R
h,t + Ft,
(4.13)
where
ξR,t =
φh
2δh
(
hR,t − (1− δh)hR,t−1
hR,t−1
− δh
)2
qthR,t−1, (4.14)
for which ξR,t is the real adjustment cost for housing, Ft denotes lump-sum
profits received from the retailers (described below), and βN < βR. The
latter assumption guarantees an equilibrium in which non-regular workers
will hit the borrowing constraint.
4.2.3 Entrepreneurs of intermediate consumption goods
Entrepreneurs produce intermediate consumption goods, which are differen-
tiated and which face perfect competition. They hire workers of two types
(non-regular and regular workers) as labor inputs LN,t and LR,t and they
have access to a production function in producing intermediate goods:
Yc,t = Ac,t
[(
LRc,t
)(1−ac,t) (LNc,t)ac,t]µc (4.15)
and equivalently
ac,t =
wcN,tLNc,t
wcN,tLNc,t + wcR,tL
R
c,t
where Ac,t denotes productivity and obeys the AR(1) process12, which does
not affect the non-regular worker ratio as a result of empirical examination,
parameter µc is the labor income share for intermediate goods, and st is the
time-varying ratio of non-regular workers and obeys AR(1) process. Finally,
entrepreneurs maximize their own profits as Πt, subject to Equations (15)
and (16).
Πc,t =
Yc,t
Xt
− (wcR,tLRc,t + wcN,tLNc,t)
12From empirical evidence presented in previous sections, one assumes that technology
is unrelated to the non-regular worker ratio directly.
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4.2.4 Retailers
To introduce the source of nominal stickiness in the model economy, Bernanke
et al. (1999) is followed, with the assumption that monopolistic competition
occurs at the “retail” level. Final good Y Ft is a CES composite of a continuum
of mass unity of differentiated retailers, indexed by z. They purchase inter-
mediate outputs from entrepreneurs at PEt and use them as the sole input.
Total final goods are the following composite of individual retail goods:
Y Ft =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(z)
($−1)/$dz
]−$/($−1)
, (4.16)
with ! > 1. The corresponding price index is given by
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(z)
(1−$)dz
]1/(1−$)
. (4.17)
Therefore, each retailer faces an individual demand curve:
Yt(z) =
(
Pt(z)
Pt
)−$
Y Ft . (4.18)
The retailer choose the sale price Pt(z), taking as given the demand curve
and the price of wholesale goods, Pwt .
To introduce nominal rigidities, a retailer can adjust its price freely with
probability 1− θ, following Calvo (1983). Letting P ∗t (z) be the “reset” price
set by retailers who are able to revise their prices at period t, and letting
Y ∗t (z) be the demand at this price, then the retailer chooses a price to max-
imize the expected discounted profit, given as
∞∑
t=0
θkEt
[
Λt,k
(
P ∗t (z)− Pwt+k
Pt+k
)
Y ∗t+k(z)
]
, (4.19)
where Λt,k ≡ β(cR,t/cR,t+k) is the regular worker household relevant discount
factor.
Differentiating the objective with respect to P ∗t , the optimal price has to
satisfy the following condition of
∞∑
t=0
θkEt
[
Λt,k
(
P ∗t (z)
Pt+k
− X
Xt+k
)
Y ∗t+k(z)
]
= 0, (4.20)
64
where Xt(≡ Pt/Pwt ) is the markup, which equal to X∗ = !/(! − 1) in
steady state. As in BGG and Iacoviello (2005), this condition states that
P ∗t equates the expected discounted marginal revenue to the expected dis-
counted marginal cost. Given that the fraction θ of retailers do note change
their price in period t, the aggregate price evolves according to
Pt = [θP
1−$
t−1 + (1− θ)′(P ∗t )1−$]1/(1−$). (4.21)
By combining Equation (22) and (23), and then log-linearizing, it is possible
to yield a forward-looking Phillips curve.
4.2.5 Housing producers
In a competitive flexible price market, new homes are produced with labor
only and without productivity. The production technology is
Yh,t =
[(
LRh,t
)(1−ah,t) (LNh,t)ah,t]µh (4.22)
and equivalently
ah,t =
whN,tLNh,t
whN,tLNh,t + whR,tL
R
h,t
.
Housing producers solve the following maximization to hire labor:
Πh,t = qtYh,t − (whR,tLRh,t + whN,tLNh,t).
4.2.6 Central bank
Monetary policy is conducted using a simple Taylor-type rule as
Rt = (Rt−1)γR
(
pi1+γpit−1 (Y
F
c,t−1/Yc,t−1)
γxR∗
)1−γR !R,t (4.23)
where R∗ denotes the steady state real interest rate, Y Ft−1 is the final output
(total demand) by retailer, and Y Nt−1 stands for the natural rate of output.
In addition, !R,t is a policy shock assumed to have zero mean, with variance
σ$R .
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4.2.7 Market clearing
The market clearing conditions are given by the following:
Ct = (1− st)× cR,t + st × cN,t, (4.24)
Ht = (1− st)× hR,t + st × hN,t, (4.25)
Y Fc,t = Ct, (4.26)
Yh,t = (1− st)(hR,t − (1− δh)hR,t−1) + st(hN,t − (1− δh)hN,t−1),
(4.27)
0 = (1− st)× bR,t + st × bN,t, (4.28)
Y Fc,t = Dt × Yc,t, (4.29)
and finally,
Dt = θDt−1piαt + (1− θ)
(
1− θpiθ−1t
1− θ
)− α1−θ
. (4.30)
In those equations, Ct represents the total spending for consumption, Ht
stands for the total spending for housing investment, and Dt denotes price
dispersion13. Equations (19)-(24) respectively represent the goods market,
the total household consumption, the borrowing?lending relation, resource
constraint for real estate, the linkage between wholesale and retail output,
and the price dispersion form.
4.2.8 Deterministic steady state
In the deterministic steady state, inflation pi∗ is assumed as one. Therefore,
R∗ corresponds to the real interest rate. It is equal to the reciprocal of the
regular workers’discount rate 1/βR from their consumption Euler condition.
Because of the assumption that the regular workers’ discount rate is greater
than the non-regular workers’ discount rate, βN < βR. In this case, it is
necessary to verify that the debt of non-regular workers is always positive.
It is possible to evaluate (8) in the steady state and obtain
b∗N
Y ∗
= m(1− δh)βR{fhΩ5R + Ω1N(Ω5N − fc)} (4.31)
13See Gertler and Karadi (2010).
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where
Ω1N =
j(1− βNfhs∗)
{1− βN(1− δh)− (βR − βN)m(1− δh)}(1− fcs∗) > 0, (4.32)
and where Ω5R and Ω5N > 0 respectively represent the steady state of housing
price and consumption for non-regular workers14. The steady-state debt for
regular workers
b∗R
Y ∗ is always negative − s
∗
1−s∗
b∗N
Y ∗ and corresponds to saving.
It is particularly interesting that the amount of saving that regular workers
need to prepare for non-regular workers’loans depends on the steady-state
non-regular worker ratio s∗, i.e., if the steady state s∗ is set to 0.34, a regular
worker saves half the amount which a non-regular worker borrows, whereas a
regular worker must save more than the required amount by a regular worker
when s∗ > 0.50.
4.2.9 Calibration and solution method
Some parameters are calibrated based on the data sample means and other
studies. The steady-state real rate of interest is set as R∗ = 1.5. Then,
because it is pinned down by the regular workers’discount rate, this setting
implies that (1/βR)4 = 1.015, and in turn that βR = 0.996. The non-regular
worker’s discount rate was set as βN = 0.95. Next, the parameters ηR, ηN ,
eR, and eN , specifying the disutility of labor, were set respectively to 3.00,
2.00, 0.40, and 0.8015. The non-regular worker “loan-to-value” ratio m is set
to 0.50 initially. Finally, as in Iacoviello (2005), the parameters j are set to
0.10.
The existence of non-regular workers can be specified further. When
scheduled hours worked for regular workers in the market of consumption
goods L¯c,R is valued as 1.28, from the empirical result that scheduled working
hours for regular workers are 1.73 times as great as those of non-regular work-
ers, non-regular workers’ scheduled hours L¯c,N were set to 0.73 (=1.28/1.73).
Similarly, if scheduled hours worked for regular workers in the market of
housing are valued as 0.13, then non-regular workers’scheduled hours L¯h,N
are 0.08. As economy-wide parameters, an annual depreciation rate for hous-
ing is chosen as 0.04 percent: δh = 0.01. Furthermore, the habit parameters
fc and fh are set respectively to 0.11 and 0.00.
14See Appendix for more information.
15These settings follow Horvath (2000).
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As firms’ parameters, the income share of consumption goods µc, and
the income share of housing µh were set respectively to 0.63, and 0.70. The
elasticity α is 30. The degree of nominal rigidity to generate a frequency of
price adjustment of about eight quarters is the probability of not resetting
prices θ. Following Sugo and Ueda (2008), who estimated Japan’s Bayesian
DSGE model, θ equals 0.87. Moreover, the elasticity of substitution of in-
termediate goods ! is set to 5, implying a steady state mark-up X∗(= $$−1)
of 25%. For the steady state ratio of non-regular workers s∗, it was set to
0.34, which results from the data sample mean. Finally, for the Taylor rule,
as in Sugo and Ueda (2008), the following were set: γx = 0.11, γpi = 0.60,
and γR = 0.84.
The solution methods consist in taking a log-linear approximation of the
equilibrium conditions in the neighborhood of the deterministic steady state.
Dynare was used, which derives the reduced form representation of the DSGE
model and which automatically provides stability and eigenvalue analysis.
4.3 Simulation results
4.3.1 Baseline responses
It is straightforward to demonstrate the ability to produce an empirically
plausible response to non-regular worker ratio shock. Figures 6 and 7 display
the impulse responses of selected variables to a persistent ratio shock 16.
These variables are selected as macroeconomic variables described in Section
II. Figures show the responses of ten key variables: aggregate consumption,
housing investment, output for consumption, output for housing investment,
inflation, the output gap, nominal interest rate, housing prices, savings, and
borrowing.
consumption goods
Aggregate consumption (i.e. consumption goods) is examined first. Partic-
ularly the impact elasticity of consumption to a 10-percent increase in the
non-regular worker ratio is around -0.02. This result, in terms of shape, is
close to the empirical value. This arises from the realization that the ratio
shock has persistence.
16It is a 10 basis points innovation
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This picture highlights the reason underlying the success of the model
in tracking down the empirical negative elasticity of spending to ratio. To
better understand the result, it is useful to interpret that the figures exhibit
responses of each type of worker (non-regular and regular worker). As de-
scribed in Section 2, s can relate to the share of non-regular worker’s wage.
Therefore, one can presume that if s goes up, then income for non-regular
worker rises and non-regular worker can consume more consumption goods
so that income for non-regular workers rises. However, such a mechanism
by which non-regular workers ’income rises seems not to be at work in the
model17. The top left and right in Figure 8 display the impulse responses of
consumption by regular workers (right) and non-regular workers (left) to the
ratio shock. The rise in the non-regular ratio reduces the regular worker ’
s consumption and increases the non-regular worker ’s consumption. The
two responses go in opposite directions, and for a scale of impact, the latter
reaction is much greater than the former. Therefore, aggregate consumption
declines because the negative effects of both regular workers and ratio itself
are dominant.
Details of the mechanism underlying each worker’s consumption can be
discussed. Therefore, it is useful to reinterpret the linearized optimality con-
dition between the ratio and consumption. For instance, for regular workers,
it can be written as
cˆR,t = CR,−1cˆR,t−1 + CR,+1EtcˆR,t+1 − CR,+2EtcˆR,t+2 + CN,−1cˆN,t−1 − CN,0cˆN,t
+ CN,+1EtcˆN,t+1 − SR,−1sˆt−1 + SR,0sˆt − SR,+1Etsˆt+1 −R(Rˆt − Etpit+1),
(4.33)
where
CR,−1, CR,0, CR,+1, CR,+2, CN,−1, CN,0, CN,+1,SR,−1,SR,0,SR,+1,R > 0.
This equation clearly illustrates that, keeping consumption in regular and
non-regular cases, immediately after the shock, the effect of expected non-
regular worker ratio is negative and large. Thereafter, by adding to the
effect of past ratio, the negative effect on regular worker ’s consumption
expands well. Moreover, this equation is reinterpreted as a demand equation
for consumption goods based on the intertemporal work style, which means
that the negative sign of the term st−1 is the memory of a past event, that
17Full details will be explained later in Section 4.2.
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the positive sign of the term st is a relief that a present ratio st is exactly
lower than past ratio st−1, and that the negative sign of the term st+1 signifies
anxiety about an increasing ratio.
Regarding the response of output for consumption goods after shock, it
shows the same characteristics of response as aggregate consumption does
(bottom left in Figure 6). However, the output gap is slightly positive and
hump-shaped. Moreover, the reaction of inflation is sharply negative, but
inflation is not negative and the sale price does not fall in terms of a deviation
from the steady state because the steady state of inflation is assumed to be 1.
From the Taylor rule assumption, the nominal interest rate depends mainly
upon the interest rate inertia (middle left in Figure 7).
Let me think of the mechanism behind these results (pi < 1 and pi ≈ 1 and
x > 0), referring to Figure 4 that displays the supply-demand relationship
between retailers and wholesalers (entrepreneurs)18. Assuming the steady
state before shock express a point E in the figure, the results for both re-
tailers and wholesalers as their reactions to a shock stands for the points
M and N respectively. With respect to each response of price and quantity,
as I described, since (retail price) inflation is strictly close to 1% but less
than 1%, retail price goes up from the steady state price, and from Equa-
tion (18), intermediate goods demanded (final goods supplied) by retailers
decline. Meanwhile, in order to generate the positive output gap, the output
by wholesalers decreases more than the retailers’ one. Hence, wholesale price
is lower than the steady state price for wholesalers. This means that the
mark-up Xt (≡ pt/pwt ) rises and that it consistently causes inflation down
according to NKPC pˆit = βRpˆit−1 − κXˆt.
The mechanism underlying these results ( pi < 1 and pi ≈ 1 and x > 0 )
can be inferred by referring to Figure 4, which displays the supply demand
relation between retailers and wholesalers (entrepreneurs)19. Assuming the
steady state before shock express a point E in the figure, the results for both
retailers and wholesalers as their reactions to a shock stands respectively
for points M and N. With respect to each response of price and quantity,
as described earlier, because (retail price) inflation is strictly close to 1%
but less than 1%, the retail price increases from the steady state price, and
18In the paper, I consider that the goods supplied to households are different with the
goods produced by retailers. Therefore, a vertical axis in the figure stands for two kinds
of price.
19The goods supplied to households differ from goods produced by retailers. Therefore,
a vertical axis in the figure stands for prices of two kinds.
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from Equation (18), intermediate goods demanded (final goods supplied)
by retailers decline. To generate the positive output gap, the output by
wholesalers decreases more than the retailers’output. Therefore, wholesale
prices are lower than the steady state price for wholesalers. The mark-up
Xt (≡ pt/pwt ) rises. It consistently brings inflation down according to NKPC
pˆit = βRpˆit−1 − κXˆt.
housing investment
The top right area of Figure 6 displays the response of aggregate housing
investment to a ratio shock. The increase in the ratio reduces aggregate
housing investment as well as aggregate consumption. The effect of a ratio
shock keeps 1 percent persistently, even at 20 quarters after shock. To as-
certain the mechanism behind this result, it is necessary to estimate each
response of both regular and non-regular workers to a change in ratio. The
bottom right and left in Figure 8 display a positive reaction of non-regular
workers ’housing investment and a negative reaction of regular workers to
the shock. Although the figures in this paper display the responses of model
variables until 20 quarters, for instance, the peak response of non-regular
workers’housing investment reaches 7.33% at 29 quarters after a shock, and
the response of regular workers comes up to -0.16% at 32 quarters. Both re-
sponses persistently maintain a situation in which the variables deviate from
the steady states.
As in the case of aggregate consumption, the demand equation must be
shown for housing investment for a regular worker. Housing investment can
be expressed as the following:
hˆR,t = −HcR,−1cˆR,t−1 −HcR,0cˆR,t +HcR,+1cˆR,t+1 +HcR,+2cˆR,t+2 −HcN ,−1cˆN,t−1
+HcN ,0cˆN,t +HcN ,+1cˆN,t+1 +HR,−1hˆR,t−1 +HR,+1hˆR,t+1 +HN,−1hˆN,t−1
−HN,0hˆN,t + SR,−1sˆt−1 − SR,0sˆt + SR,+1sˆt+1 (4.34)
where
HcR,−1,HcR,0,HcR,+1,HcR,+2,HcN ,−1,HcN ,0,HcN ,+1,HR,−1,HR,+1,HN,−1,
HN,0,SR,−1,SR,0,SR,+1 > 0
This equation illustrates clearly that, keeping other terms constant except
for the term of the ratio, the current term of ratio on hR,t has a dominant
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negative effect. Moreover, according to the characteristic of housing that it
has durability, i.e., that it is not completely consumed in one period, regular
workers need not increase housing at the current period after shock st and
are able to support their housing demand from st−1 and Etst+1.
As in the case of aggregate consumption, the positive response of non-
regular workers’ housing demand is apparently caused by a change in their
income. In the sector of housing production, as assumed for simplicity, an
increase in ratio can mean that the income share of regular workers changes
negatively. Therefore, non-regular workers generally earn more from a hous-
ing sector and add to housing investment. However, the results were not
what they seem to be20. The demand for non-regular workers ’housing
investment grows mainly because the housing price decreased. After shock,
the non-regular workers who provide shorter worked hours than regular work-
ers play a more important role in producing housing, the power of housing
production, and its price fall (see the middle right in Figure 7). However, in-
terestingly, the fall in price can be reinterpreted as follows. Declining housing
prices stimulate non-regular workers’ housing demand and prevent aggregate
housing demand from falling more than necessary.
Although each response is not compatible because the size of shock in the
empirical model is not the same as that of the theoretical model, to compare
the differences in the empirical responses of both housing and aggregate con-
sumption with the differences in the theoretical responses is insightful. In an
empirical model, the degree of the response in housing is 6.25 times as great
as that of aggregate consumption. Housing is 6.93 times as great, in terms
of consumption, in the theoretical model. The results are not particularly
different. Consequently, in the part of this paper describing calibration, it
seems certain that the choices of values in deep parameters are consistent
with those of the actual economy.
Saving and borrowing
The bottom right and left in Figure 7 display the responses of negative bor-
rowing (i.e. saving) by regular workers to a ratio shock (left) and the response
of positive borrowing (i.e. usual borrowing) by non-regular workers (right).
Increasing in non-regular workers, regular workers reduce saving21. They
20I will document the full details later.
21When‘ saving ’is expressed as a kind of‘ borrowing, ’the steady state of saving
is expressed as a negative sign. Therefore, what the positive response in this figure show
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decrease it from the steady state by more than 6% and remain around 2%,
even at 20 quarters. It is sure to be persistent. After the shock, non-regular
workers change borrowing to a low level by more than 5%. Furthermore,
they maintain such a low level. From 10 quarters, the response becomes pos-
itive. These results can be interpreted as follows. The increase in non-regular
workers is simply equivalent to the decline in regular workers’income here.
Therefore, if it occurs, then they reduce saving. Furthermore, non-regular
workers are temporarily able to attain self-finance for purchasing housing
without borrowing because of the fall in housing prices, and it is mostly dur-
ing 10 quarters. Thereafter, when housing prices revert to the steady state
and nominal interest rates fall, they recommence borrowing using housing as
collateral.
4.3.2 Each response in between non-regular and regu-
lar
The immediately preceding subsection presented an exploration of the effects
of an increasing ratio shock on some basic variables representing the economy.
This subsection presents an examination of the reaction of each type of worker
(non-regular worker or regular worker) to the shock. Although the demands
of consumption and housing by non-regular workers and regular workers have
been described, they are reviewed below.
After a shock, the demand for aggregate consumption declines. Non-
regular workers add to consumption and regular workers decline. Therefore,
because of the increase in non-regular workers who are part-time workers,
output for consumption goods declines less than demand. A positive out-
put gap occurs, and inflation increases slightly. According to total housing
demand or each demand, the results are similar to those in the case of con-
sumption goods. Non-regular workers need not turn to borrowing to pur-
chase housing because they earn constant income irrespective of the shock
and housing price fall. Regular workers, who have declining income, decide
to decrease borrowing (see Figures 6-8).
Some discussion of the responses of income for each worker should be
made. In the model, results of both all worked hours and every wage are
displayed in Figure 9. Based upon the assumption of model, an increase in
the ratio of non-regular workers means that the income of non-regular workers
is that saving is lower than the steady state level.
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grows up. However, reading the figure, it can be readily understood that to
generate such a mechanism is not easy. Although income for regular workers
declines22, income for non-regular workers mostly remains unchanged. In the
labor markets of both consumption goods and housing, the decline in worked
hours offsets the rise in wages.
Moreover, as the figure shows, the changes in labor demand and supply
have results related to the impulse responses. First, the responses of worked
hours and wage in labor market of consumption goods for regular workers are
that worked hours decline by 0.02% and that wages also decline by 0.84%.
Figure 5-(i) explains these results. In raising the ratio, the demand of labor
force to regular workers declines: this indicates a leftward shift of curve. Fur-
thermore, then, regular workers emphasize working rather than consumption
and supply more worked hours (a rightward shift). Second, the responses of
worked hours and wages in the labor market of housing for regular workers
are that worked hours rise by 0.06% and that the wage decreases by around
0.79%. Some shifts in Figure 5-(ii) occur for mostly the same reasons as
the case of consumption goods. Finally, the responses of worked hours and
wage in labor market of consumption goods and housing for regular workers
are that worked hours decline by 13.0% and 26.9% and that wages rise by
12.7% and 26.6%. Because housing declines completely, despite the empha-
sis on non-regular workers, they reduce their worked hours (a leftward shift)
(see Figure 5-(iii)). Firms of both consumption goods and housing need not
change demand for non-regular workers so that they attain minimum cost.
4.3.3 Comparison of responses in different parameter
value
I have examined the responses of model variables under the baseline set-
tings. In this subsection, in changing some parameter values, I gain new
implications of the model.
The chosen parameters are s∗, m, and ρs. Let me think the reasons why
they are picked up respectively. First, s∗ means the steady-state ratio of
non-regular workers to all workers. To revalue this parameter is equal to a
change into non-regular workers in the economy. I allow the new values of s∗
to be 0.17 and 0.51. The reason why more than 0.51 is not consider is that
22In the labor market related to housing, because the increasing rate of worked hours is
greater the decreasing rate of wage, income is lowered.
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it is not feasible that non-regular workers account for more than 50% of the
whole workers in real economy. Second, m is the parameter that reflects how
non-regular workers’ borrowing is close to their housing value. The higher
m is, the closer their borrowing is to the maximum limits. On the other
hand, if m is low, borrowing is small even though housing is valued highly.
Here m is assumed to be 0.30 and 0.80. Finally, the parameter ρs sets the
persistence in the law of motion of the ratio shock. The model variable has
been defined as the exogenous variable. Therefore, if the definition of st can
be loosened, high persistence is interpreted to be a situation that non-regular
workers have been hired for a longer time since they increased by more than
steady state. So when I set ρs for 0.30 and 0.50 respectively, this means that
non-regular workers their employment is not so long.
Figure 10 through 15 illustrate how model variables respond to the ratio
shock under alternative values of the three chosen parameters. First of all,
for s∗, Figure 10 and 11 display the natural and clear result. That is, the less
non-regular workers are, the better of course. The figures of both demand and
supply of every goods particularly illustrate that the smaller the steady state
ratio of non-regular workers is, the smaller the negative deviations are. Next,
let me see the results of m (see Figure 12 and 13). Iacoviello (2005) stressed
that the higher the value of loan-to-value is, the more non-regular workers
consume in the reaction to asset price rising. Therefore, generally speaking,
m has a function that amplifies some effects on consumption (Iacoviello’s
“the asset price”). Although the sign is opposite to Iacoviello, the same
results are not found in this paper. The bigger the value of loan-to-value
is, the less consumption decline by the negative effect of the ratio shock
(and the negative response of asset price). Hence, as the results shown, it
turned out that the parameter m that is expected to play a role to increase
borrowing and to expand consumption contrarily amplifies the negativeness
of consumption. Finally, in Figure 14 and 15, when the persistence of shock
process is low, the convergence is naturally rapid or the change to the shock is
small. I can conduct an implication as follows. In order to avoid the negative
deviation from the steady state, the added non-regular workers should be not
employed for so long time.
The responses of model variables under the baseline settings were exam-
ined. This subsection, in changing some parameter values, presents some
novel implications of the model.
The chosen parameters, selected for various reasons, are s∗, m, and ρs.
First, s∗ represents the steady-state ratio of non-regular workers to all work-
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ers. To revalue this parameter is equivalent to a change in non-regular work-
ers in the economy. The new values of s∗ are set as 0.17 and 0.51. Values
greater than 0.51 are not considered because it is not feasible that non-regular
workers account for more than 50% of all workers in a real economy. Second,
m is the parameter reflecting how non-regular workers ’borrowing is close
to their housing value. The higher m is, the closer their borrowing is to the
maximum limits. However, if m is low, then borrowing is small even though
housing is valued highly. Here m is assumed to be 0.30 and 0.80. Finally,
parameter ρs sets the persistence in the law of motion of the ratio shock.
The model variable has been defined as the exogenous variable. Therefore,
if the definition of s∗ can be loosened, high persistence is interpreted to be
a situation by which non-regular workers have been hired for a longer time
because they increased by more than steady state. Therefore, ρs was set
for 0.30 and 0.50 respectively, non-regular workers have a shorter term of
employment.
Figures 10 through 15 portray how model variables respond to the ratio
shock under alternative values of the three chosen parameters. First, for
s∗, Figures 10 and 11 display the natural and clear result: the fewer the
non-regular workers are, the better. The figures of both demand and supply
of every good particularly illustrate that the smaller the steady state ratio
of non-regular workers is, the smaller the negative deviations are. Next,
the results of m (see Figures 12 and 13) are noteworthy. Iacoviello (2005)
emphasized that the higher the value of loan-to-value is, the more non-regular
workers consume in the reaction to asset price rising. Therefore, generally
speaking,m amplifies some effects of consumption (Iacoviello’s “asset price”).
Although the sign is opposite to that presented by Iacoviello, the same results
are not found from results of this study. The larger the value of the loan-to-
value is, the less consumption declines because of the negative effect of the
ratio shock (and the negative response of asset price). Therefore, as results
show, parameterm, which is expected to play a role to increase borrowing and
to expand consumption, contrarily amplifies the negativeness of consumption.
Finally, in Figures 14 and 15, when the persistence of shock process is low,
the convergence is naturally rapid or the change to the shock is small. The
salient implications are as follows. To avoid the negative deviation from the
steady state, the added non-regular workers should be not contracted for
employment for long periods.
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4.4 Conclusions
This paper has explained that an increase in non-regular workers can account
for the current stagnated demand in Japan. Use of a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model yields some policy implications. The
key idea is that, by raising the number of non-regular workers who face
borrowing constraints, expenditures on goods that require external finance
such as housing investment decline, which causes stagnated demand in Japan.
By the increase of non-regular workers, results show that expenditures
on consumption and housing decrease, and that housing is more sensitive to
a non-regular workers ’shock than consumption is. These results support
the empirically obtained results. As featured results coming from the model,
although income for regular workers declined, against expectations, the non-
regular workers’income was constant. Under such circumstances, increasing
housing demand of non-regular workers results from a fall in housing prices.
The model presents three implications as follows: 1) it is better to lower
the number of non-regular workers; 2) even though it is easier to borrow,
spending does not increase; and 3) even if non-regular workers are employed,
they should not be employed over the long term.
One limitation of the model is that, for simplicity, the ratio of non-regular
workers was examined as an exogenous variable. In fact, the variable should
be controlled as a problem of firm optimization.
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Table 4.1: Baseline Parameter Value
Parameters Descriptions Value Reference
Regular worker
βR discount factor 0.996 Original
ηR labor supply aversion 3.000 Sugo and Ueda (2008)
eR labor supply aversion 0.800 Sugo and Ueda (2008)
Non-regular worker
βN discount factor 0.950 Original
ηN labor supply aversion 2.000 Sugo and Ueda (2008)
eN housing depreciation 0.400 Original
m loan-to-value 0.500 Original
Entrepreneurs & Retailers
µc income share 0.630 Original
µh income share 0.700 Original
θ probability fixed price 0.875 Sugo and Ueda (2008)
α elasticity of substitution 30.00 Sugo and Ueda (2008)
Economy
fc consumption habit 0.110 Original
fh housing habit 0.000 Original
j weight on housing services 0.100 Iacoviello (2005)
δh housing depreciation 0.010 Original
Monetary Policy & Shocks
γR lagged interest rate 0.842 Sugo and Ueda (2008)
γpi inflation 0.606 Sugo and Ueda (2008)
γx output gap 0.110 Sugo and Ueda (2008)
ρA productivity 0.949 Sugo and Ueda (2008)
ρs non-regular worker ratio 0.900 Original
σA productivity 0.843 Sugo and Ueda (2008)
σs non-regular worker ratio 0.100 Original
σR monetary policy 0.066 Sugo and Ueda (2008)
78
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Time (year)
lab
or
 fo
rc
e 
(m
illi
on
)
 
 
ra
tio
 (%
)
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
Regular
Non−regular
ratio (right)
Figure 4.1: Employee by type of employment and non-regular worker ratio,
Japan
Source: Special Survey of the Labour Force Survey, from 1984 to 2008.
Note: Bar graph shows the number of employees by type of employment. The
unit is millions. The charcoal bar denotes regular workers, and the light gray
denotes non-regular workers. The line graph shows the fraction of non-regular
workers, for which the unit is percentage on the right axis. Non-regular
workers include part-time workers, temporary workers, dispatched workers
from temporary labor agency, contract employees or entrusted employees,
and others. The regular workers are regular staff or employees.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Annual Income, Japan
Source: Employment Status Survey, 2002 and 2007.
Note: The definition of non-regular workers is the same as that in Figure 1.
The vertical axis expresses the number of employees. The unit is millions.
The horizontal axis shows the class of annual income earned by the employees.
The unit is millions of yen. The medians are roughly estimated as around 0.8
million (Non-regular) and around 3.9 million (Regular) in 2002, and to be
around 1.2 million (Non-regular) and around 4.1 million (Regular) in 2007.
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Figure 4.3: VAR Evidence, Japan
Note: VAR estimated from 1990Q4 to 2008Q4. The dashed lines indicate 90-
percent confidence bands. The Choleski ordering of the impulse responses is
TFP , ratio, Consumption, Housing. Coordinate: percent deviation from
the baseline. TFP is calculated based upon Kamada and Masuda (2001) and
Kawamoto (2004), who adopted the TANKAN DI.
81
YC
YCf
PE ≈ PEw
Price
Output
output gap
N
M
E
PM
PNw
YC,N YC,Mf
Figure 4.4: Diagram of the relation between the entrepreneurs’ production
function Yc and the retailers ’demand function Y fc .
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Figure 4.5: Diagram of the relation between the labor supply and labor
demand: (i) shows the regular workers market for consumption goods; (ii)
shows the regular worker market for housing investment; and (iii) shows the
non-regular worker market for consumption goods and housing investment.
83
5 10 15 20
−0.02
−0.015
−0.01
−0.005
0
C
5 10 15 20
−0.06
−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
H
5 10 15 20
−0.025
−0.02
−0.015
−0.01
−0.005
0
Yc
5 10 15 20
−0.06
−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
Yh
Figure 4.6: Impulse responses to a increasing ratio shock.
Note: Vertical axis: deviation from steady state. Horizontal axis: time
horizon in quarters.
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Figure 4.7: Impulse responses to a increasing ratio shock.
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Figure 4.8: Impulse responses to a increasing ratio shock.
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Figure 4.9: Impulse responses to a increasing ratio shock.
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Figure 4.10: Impulse responses to a increasing ratio shock: effect of varying
the steady state of ratio.
Note: Vertical axis: deviation from steady state. Horizontal axis: time
horizon in quarters.
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Figure 4.11: Impulse responses to a increasing ratio shock: effect of varying
the steady state of ratio.
Note: Vertical axis: deviation from steady state. Horizontal axis: time
horizon in quarters.
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Figure 4.12: Impulse responses to a increasing ratio shock: effect of varying
‘loan-to-value’.
Note: Vertical axis: deviation from steady state. Horizontal axis: time
horizon in quarters.
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Figure 4.13: Impulse responses to a increasing ratio shock: effect of varying
‘loan-to-value’.
Note: Vertical axis: deviation from steady state. Horizontal axis: time
horizon in quarters.
91
5 10 15 20
−0.02
−0.015
−0.01
−0.005
0
C
5 10 15 20
−0.06
−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
H
5 10 15 20
−0.03
−0.025
−0.02
−0.015
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
Yc
5 10 15 20
−0.07
−0.06
−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
Yh
 
 
Bench
ρs=0.30
ρs=0.50
Figure 4.14: Impulse responses to a increasing ratio shock: effect of varying
the degree of persistence.
Note: Vertical axis: deviation from steady state. Horizontal axis: time
horizon in quarters.
92
5 10 15 20
−6
−4
−2
0
2
x 10−4 π
5 10 15 20
−5
0
5
10
15
x 10−3 x
5 10 15 20
−5
0
5
10
15
x 10−4 R
5 10 15 20
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
q
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.05
0.1
bR
5 10 15 20
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
bN
 
 
Bench
ρs=0.30
ρs=0.50
Figure 4.15: Impulse responses to a increasing ratio shock: effect of varying
the degree of persistence.
Note: Vertical axis: deviation from steady state. Horizontal axis: time
horizon in quarters.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In Chapter 2, this study demonstrates quantitatively the degree to which
uncertainty originates from the revision of data inherent in the real-time es-
timation of the Japan’s equilibrium real interest rate (ERR). It also presents
attempts to reduce that uncertainty. Results show that markedly high uncer-
tainty results from data revision. A modified model is proposed to estimate
a more credible ERR that includes lowered uncertainty with revision-free
data. Furthermore, the Bank of Japan, while facing that uncertainty has
made three judgment errors because it did not recognize reliable ERR.
In Chapter 3, this study reconsiders whether the monetary policy in the
late 1980’s was delayed. There is not any previous studies that evaluate the
past monetary policy using the model-consitent latent variable from Bayesian
estimation. I find that there does not exist the delay of monetary policy.This
paper presents reconsideration of whether monetary policy in the late 1980s
was delayed. No report in the literature describes studies evaluating past
monetary policy using the model-consistent latent variable from Bayesian
estimation. The delay of monetary policy can be found exactly. This paper
confirms the necessity of the zero lower bound constraint in a DSGE model.
In Chapter 4, this study specifically examines features of labor supply het-
erogeneity in Japanese households and describes how such a structure affects
household expenditure, which has stagnated during the last two decades.
The particular circumstances represent the increase of non-regular workers
but are not necessarily limited to Japan. Non-regular workers are definable
in many dimensions, but a common feature is that they have quite unstable
contracts of employment. If such labor increases greatly, then one can assess
the impact on the actual economy. Therefore, a general equilibrium model
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was constructed to explain some empirical VAR evidence. The model shows
that the reactions of aggregate consumption and housing investment to the
shock of increasing non-regular worker ratio are negative and that they are
consistent with empirical results. Housing investment exhibits greater sensi-
tivity to the shock. Moreover, decreasing output for consumption goods and
housing investment in response to the shock is greater than that decrease
of demand. This paper suggests that employing few non-regular workers
is preferred and that non-regular workers should not be employed for long
periods.
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